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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three individual chapters. The first chapter applies lattice
theoretic techniques in order to establish fundamental properties of Bayesian games of
strategic substitutes (GSS) when the underlying type space is ordered either in increas-
ing or decreasing first-order stochastic dominance. Existence and uniqueness of equi-
libria is considered, as well as the question of when such equilibria can be guaranteed
to be monotone in type, a property which is used to guarantee monotone comparative
statics. The second chapter uses the techniques of the first and combines them with the
existing results for strategic complements (GSC) in order to extend the literature on
global games under both GSC and GSS. In particular, the model of Carlsson and Van
Damme (1993) is extended from 2×2 games to GSS or GSC involving a finite amount
of players, each having a finite action space. Furthermore, the possibility that groups
of players receive the same signal is allowed for, a condition which is new to the lit-
erature. It is shown that under this condition, the power of the model to resolve the
issue of multiplicity is unambiguously increased. The third chapter considers stability
of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in GSS.
Chapter 1 analyzes Bayesian games of strategic substitutes under general conditions.
In particular, when beliefs are order either increasingly or decreasingly by first order
stochastic dominance, the existence and uniqueness, monotonicity, and comparative
statics in this broad class of games are addressed. Unlike their supermodular coun-
terpart, where the effect of an increase in type augments the strategic effect between
own strategy and opponent’s strategy, submodularity produces competing effects when
considering optimal responses. Using adaptive dynamics, conditions are given under
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which such games can be guaranteed to exhibit Bayesian Nash equilibria, and it is
shown that in many applications these equilibria will be a profile of monotone strate-
gies. Comparative statics of parametrized games is also analyzed using results from
submodular games which are extended to incorporate incomplete information. Several
examples are provided.
The framework of Chapter 1 is applied to global games in Chapter 2. Global games
methods are aimed at resolving issues of multiplicity of equilibria and coordination
failure that arise in game theoretic models by relaxing common knowledge assump-
tions about an underlying parameter. These methods have recently received a lot of
attention when the underlying complete information game is a GSC. Little has been
done in this direction concerning GSS, however. This chapter complements the exist-
ing literature in both cases by extending the global games method developed by Carls-
son and Van Damme (1993) to multiple player, multiple action GSS and GSC, using
a p-dominance condition as the selection criterion. This approach helps circumvent
recent criticisms to global games by relaxing some possibly unnatural assumptions on
payoffs and parameters necessary to conduct analysis under current methods. The sec-
ond part of this chapter generalizes the model by allowing groups of players to receive
homogenous signals, which, under certain conditions, strengthens the model’s power
of predictability.
Chapter 3 analyzes the learning and stability of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in
GSS, complementing recent work done in the case of GSC. Mixed strategies in GSS
are of particular interest because it is well known that such games need not exhibit
pure strategy Nash equilibria. First, a bound on the strategy space which indicate
where randomizing behavior may occur in equilibrium is established. Second, it is
shows that mixed strategy Nash equilibria are generally unstable under a wide variety
of learning rules.
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Chapter 1
Bayesian Games of Strategic Substitutes
1.1 Introduction
In a game of strategic substitutes (GSS), a higher action by one player induces the other players to
best respond by taking a lower action. Examples include the simple Cournot oligopoly, common-
pool resource games, provisions of public goods, and games of tournaments. With incomplete
information, Van Zandt and Vives (2007) show that in games of strategic complements (GSC),
where a higher action by one player induces the other players to best respond by taking a higher
action, when beliefs are ordered increasingly by first order stochastic dominance (FOSD), extremal
monotone Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) can be guaranteed to exist, as well as a monotone
increase in the equilibria given an upward shock in beliefs in FOSD for the beliefs of each player-
type. This chapter studies the properties of GSS under incomplete information, where the beliefs of
each type for each player over the types of the others is ordered either increasingly or decreasingly
in FOSD. Using generalized adaptive dynamics (GAD), necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence of equilibria can be derived in both cases, and in many cases their monotonicity properties
as well. GAD also provides a notion of the stability of such equilibria. The first section of the
chapter states the assumptions, and provides motivating examples. The second part addresses the
solution concepts offered by GAD, and studies separately the two different assumptions on beliefs.
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In the last section, comparative statics and the stability of equilibria is addressed.
1.2 Model and Assumptions
This chapter uses the standard lattice concepts. A game of strategic substitutes (GSS) is given by
Γ = (I,(Ai)i∈I, (ui)i∈I), whose elements are describe by:
• N players, I = {1, 2, ...N}
• Each Ai is player i’s action set, which we assume is a compact metric lattice (a compact
metric space which is a complete lattice, and the lattice operations inf and sup are contin-
uous with respect to underlying metric), implying that all order increasing and decreasing
sequences converge in metric to their respective sup and inf.1 We will sometimes make the
following assumption about the order ≥Ai on Ai, which is satisfied, for example, when Ai is
a cube in Rn:
A1. The partial order ≥Ai is closed. That is, {(a, b) ∈ A2i |b ≥Ai a} is closed in the product
topology.
• Each player i ∈ I has utility function ui : A×Ti→ R. We assume that ui is supermodular in
ai, has decreasing differences in (ai, a−i), increasing differences in (ai, ti), is continuous in
a for all ti, and is bounded.
The beliefs of the players and the measurability assumptions are described as follows:
• Each player i ∈ I has a type space Ti and an associated sigma algebra Fi, and we denote the
product measure space by (T, F ).
1See Reny (2011)
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• Each player i∈ I has a system of beliefs Pi = (pi(·| ti))ti∈Ti , where each pi(·| ti) : F−i→ [0, 1]
is a probability measure over the types of the other players. We consider two different
orderings on Pi , summarized by the two following assumptions:
A2. Pi is ordered increasingly by the first order stochastic dominance order ≥FOSD. That is,
t
′
i ≥ ti⇒pi(·| t
′
i)≥FOSD pi(·| ti)
A3. Pi is ordered decreasingly by the first order stochastic dominance order≥FOSD. That is,
t
′
i ≥ ti⇒pi(·| ti)≥FOSD pi(·| t
′
i)
• ∀i ∈ I, ∀F−i ∈F−i, ϕF−i : Ti → [0,1] , ti → pi(F−i| ti), is measurable (intuitively, given an
event F−i ∈F−i , player i can determine which of his types ti assign a specific probability
a ∈ [0,1] )
• ∀i ∈ I, ui : A×Ti→ R is measurable in Ti, for all a ∈ A.
With these primitives, a Bayesian game of strategic substitutes (BGSS) is a tuple Γ̂=(I, (Si)i∈I (Vi)∈I),
which has the following elements:
• For each player i ∈ I, Si is the space of all measurable strategy functions si : Ti→ Ai.
• For each player i ∈ I, and profile of strategy functions s−i, interim expected utility is given
by Vi(ai, s−i, ti) =
´
T−i
ui(ai, s−i(t−i), ti)d pi(t−i| ti)
• For each player i ∈ I, and strategy profile s−i, we denote
BRti(s−i) = argmaxai∈Ai
(Vi(·, s−i, ti))
as type ti’s best response correspondence. Player i′s best response correspondence is
BRi(s−i) = {si : Ti→ Ai |∀ti ∈ Ti, si(ti) ∈ BRti(s−i)}
where each si : Ti→ Ai is taken to be a measurable function.
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Definition 1. Let Γ̂=(I, (Si)i∈I (Vi)∈I) be a BGSS. A profile ŝ∈S is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
(BNE) if ∀i ∈ I , ∀ti ∈ Ti,
ŝi(ti) ∈ BRti(ŝ−i)
Equivalently, ŝ ∈S is a BNE if ∀i ∈ I,
ŝi ∈ BRi(ŝ−i)
Lemma 1. (Monotonicity Theorem). Let X be a lattice, T a partially ordered set, and f : X×T →
R be such that f satisfies supermodularity in x. If f satisfies decreasing differences in (x, t), then
ϕ(t) = argmax
x∈X
( f (x; t)) is non-increasing in t. In particular, ∨ϕ(t) and ∧ϕ(t) are non-increasing
functions of t.2
Proof. The proof can be found in Roy and Sabarwal(2010).
The defining feature of an interim Bayesian Game, like the one we are considering, as opposed
to an ex-ante Bayesian Game, is that the types of each player are counted among the players in the
game, instead of just the I original players. This implies that if Si is the space of strategy functions
for player i, then the “everywhere order” ( s
′
i≥e si iff ∀ti ∈ Ti, s
′
i(ti)≥Ai si(ti)) instead of the “almost
everywhere order” ( s
′
i ≥a.e si iff ∀ti ∈ Ti, s
′
i(ti) ≥Ai si(ti) almost everywhere) is the correct partial
order to consider on Si, as it takes the decisions of each player-type into account. However, it can
be shown that switching from the≥a.e. order to the≥e order makes Si no longer a complete lattice.
This means that given arbitrary C ⊆ Si, although ∨C and ∧C are certainly functions, it cannot be
guaranteed that they are measurable functions. Despite this, under our measurability assumptions,
Van Zandt (2010) shows that, for any given s−i, we can guarantee that ∨BRi(s−i) and ∧BRi(s−i)
are indeed measurable functions. From now on, without mention we will use ≥ to mean ≥e. Also,
when vectors of strategy functions are considered, we will also use ≥ to denote the product order.
2We say that ϕ(t ′) is higher than ϕ(t), denoted ϕ(t ′)≥S ϕ(t), if and only if ∀x ∈ ϕ(t ′),∀y ∈ ϕ(t), x∨y ∈ ϕ(t ′) and
x∧ y ∈ ϕ(t)
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A game of strategic substitutes is defined as a game in which each player’s best response is
non-increasing in the strategies of the opponents. The following Proposition establishes that under
our assumptions, the corresponding Bayesian game will in fact be a game of strategic substitutes.
Proposition 1. Suppose ∀i∈ I, ui is supermodular in ai and has decreasing differences in (ai, a−i).
Then
1. ∀ti, BRti(s−i) is non-increasing in s−i, in the sense of Lemma 1.
2. BRi is non-increasing in s−i in the product order.3 In particular,
3. ∨BRi and ∧BRi are non-increasing functions of s−i.
Proof. By Lemma 1, with X = Ai and T = S−i, and considering
BRti(s−i) = argmax
ai∈Ai
(
ˆ
T−i
ui(ai, s−i(t−i), ti)d pi(t−i| ti))
then since supermodularity and decreasing differences carry through integration, s
′
−i ≥ s−i implies
that BRti(s−i)≥S BRti(s
′
−i), giving the first claim. The second claim follows immediately from the
definition of product order. To establish the last claim, note that part 1 implies that ∨BRti and ∧BRti
are non-increasing functions of s−i. Thus the result follows by noticing that
∨BRi(s−i) = {si : Ti→ Ai|∀ti ∈ Ti, si(ti) ∈ ∨BRti(s−i)}
and likewise for ∧BRi(s−i).
3For s
′
−i ≥ s−i , then BRi(s
′
−i) is higher than BRi(s−i) if ∀ti, BRi(s
′
−i)≥S BRti(s−i).
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1.2.1 Examples
Example 1. 3 Player Cournot. Let I = {1, 2, 3}, Ti = {t iL, t iM, t iH}, and let the profit function for
player i be given by
πi(a, t i) = (a−b(q1 +q2 +q3))qi− (c− t i)qi
It is easily seen that the payoffs satisfy our submodularity assumptions.4Suppose that all players
have the same beliefs about the others, where player i′s beliefs about the types of any other player
j are given in the table below. It is easily seen that the first order stochastic dominance ordering on
each player i′s beliefs is satisfied.
Player j, j 6= i
t jL = 1 t
j
M = 2 t
j
H = 3
t iL = 1 pi(t
j
L|t iL) =3/4 pi(t
j
L|t iM) =0 pi(t
j
L|t iH) =1/4
Player i t iM = 2 pi(t
j
M|t iL) =1/6 pi(t
j
M|t iM) =1/3 pi(t
j
M|t iH) =1/2
t iH = 3 pi(t
j
H |t iL) =1/8 pi(t
j
H |t iM) =1/4 pi(t
j
H |t iH) =5/8
The best responses of each player is given by
BRti(s−i) = (
a− c+ ti
2b
)− 1
2 ∑j 6=i
E(s j| ti)
If a = 20, b = 3, c = 10, we have a unique symmetric equilibrium, given by
s̄i(ti) =

.794, t i = t iL
.986, t i = t iM
1.2 t i = t iH
, i = 1,2,3
4For f : X×Y →R differentiable, f satisfies decreasing differences in (x, y) iff ∂ f
∂x∂y ≤ 0, and because R is totally
ordered, supermodularity is automatically satisfied.
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It is important to note that in two player BGSS, the game can be analyzed as a Bayesian game
of strategic complements simply by reversing the order on one of the player’s action sets. In
this setting, extremal equilibria in monotone strategies are guaranteed to exist.5 It is therefore
interesting to note that with these specifications, we also have an equilibrium in monotone non-
decreasing strategies.
Example 2. Game of Tournaments. Let I = {1, 2, 3},Ti = {t iL, t iM, t iH}, as above. Suppose that
the players are competing for a reward, with market value r > 0, where a single winner wins the
reward with probability 1, two winners will get the reward with probability 12 , and three winners
will get the reward with probability 13 . Each player i = 1,2,3 has a private valuation of the reward,
ti , which is a percentage of the market value r. Each player chooses a level of effort xi ∈ [0,1],
which corresponds to the probability of success of being a winner, and incurs a cost cx
2
i
2 for the
level of effort. The expected reward per unit for player i is given by
πi(xi, x j, xk) = xi(1− x j)(1− xk)+
1
2
xix j(1− xk)+
1
2
xixk(1− x j)+
1
3
xix jxk
and the payoff to player i is given by ui(xi, x j, xk, ti) = tiπi(xi, x j, xk)−
cx2i
2 . We see that
∂ui
∂xi∂x j
=
ti(13xk−
1
2)≤ 0, and
∂ui
∂xi∂ ti
= (1−x j)(1−xk)+ 12x j(1−xk)+
1
2xk(1−x j)+
1
3x jxk ≥ 0, so the game
satisfies the GSS conditions. Assume that each player is certain that all other player’s share her
same relative valuation of the reward. This belief system, which satisfies A2, is written below:
Player j, j 6= i
tLj t
M
j t
H
j
tLi pi(t
L
j |tLi ) =1 pi(tMj |tLi ) =0 pi(tHj |tLi ) =0
Player i tMi pi(t
L
j |tMi ) =0 pi(tMj |tMi ) =1 pi(tHj |tMi ) =0
tHi pi(t
L
j |tHi ) =0 pi(tMj |tHi ) =0 pi(tHj |tHi ) =1
5See Van Zandt and Vives (2007).
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The best response for player-type t im is then
BRtm(s j,sk) =
tm
c
(1− 1
2
E(s j|tm)−
1
2
E(sk|tm)) =
t im
c
(1− 1
2
x jm−
1
2
xkm)
We then have a symmetric equilibrium ŝ, which is given by
ŝi(t im) =
tmi
tmi + c
, ∀i = 1, 2, 3, ∀m = L, M, H.
Example 3. Common Pool Resource Game. Suppose I = {1,2,3}, and Ti = {wLi ,wHi }. Each
player can either invest in a common resource, or an outside option, both which have diminishing
marginal return. Each player invests xi ≤ bi into the common resource, where wi > 0 is player i′s
endowment. Player i receives a proportional share of the total return on investment
xi
xi + x j + xk
(a(xi + x j + xk)−b(xi + x j + xk)2)
and receives r(wi− xi)− s(wi− xi)2 from the outside investment. Therefore, the utility to player i
is
ui(xi,x j,xk) = r(wi− xi)− s(wi− xi)2 +
xi
xi + x j + xk
(a(xi + x j + xk)−b(xi + x j + xk)2)
if xi + x j + xk > 0, and rbi− sb2i otherwise. Assume that each player is uncertain about whether
her opponents have a low endowment, wL, or a high endowment, wH , and that beliefs are given by
Player j, j 6= i
wLj w
H
j
wLi pi(w
L
j |wLi ) =0 pi(wHj |wLi ) =1
Player i wHi pi(w
L
j |wHi ) =1 pi(wHj |wHi ) =0
8
It is easily seen that the game satisfies the conditions of BGSS, where beliefs are consistent
with assumption A3, and that each player-type’s best response is given by
BRwi(s j,sk) =
a− r+2sbi
2b+2s
− b
2b+2s
(E(s j|wi)+E(sk|wi))
Then the symmetric equilibrium is given by
si(wi) =

(2b+2s)(a−r+2swLi )−2b(a−r+2swHi )
2b2+8bs+4s2 , wi = w
L
i
(2b+2s)(a−r+2swHi )−2b(a−r+2swLi )
2b2+8bs+4s2 , wi = w
H
i
, i = 1,2,3
which are monotone non-decreasing.
1.3 Characterizing Solution Concepts
We now define what it means for a sequence of strategy functions (sn)∞n=0 ⊆ 2S to satisfy adaptive
dynamics. Unlike Bayesian games with strategic complements, where extremal equilibria are guar-
anteed to exist in monotone strategies, this is not the case in BGSS. Adaptive dynamics provides
us with a way of exploiting the complementarity properties of the game in order to characterize
various solution concepts. Intuitively, adaptive dynamics dictates that each player-type eventually
behaves in such a way that her chosen actions fall above the lowest best response to the lowest
strategy played, and below the highest best response to the highest strategy played. Recall that,
under our measurability conditions, the sup and inf of the best response set does in fact lie in the
strategy set under this order, a fact which is needed in defining adaptive dynamics. Since a BGSS
can be analyzed as a GSS, in some of the proofs of this section, the reader is referred to Roy and
Sabarwal (2012), with the exception of cases when new measure theoretic arguments are needed
for this setting.
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Definition 2. Let Γ̂ = (I, (Si)i∈I (Vi)∈I) be a BGSS. ∀i ∈ I, ∀ti ∈ Ti,∀S−i ⊆S−i,
• the set of undominated responses for player-type ti is given by
URti(S−i) = {ai ∈ Ai|∀a
′
i ∈ Ai, ∃s−i ∈S−i,Vi(ai,s−i, ti)≥Vi(a
′
i,s−i, ti)}
• the set of undominated responses for player i is given by
URi(S−i) = {si ∈Si|∀ti ∈ Ti, si(ti) ∈URti(S)}
We define the set of undominated responses to S⊆S as UR(S) = ∏
i∈I
URi(S−i).
If s, s ∈ S are such that s ≥ s, define UR([s, s]) = [∧UR([s, s]), ∨UR([s, s])]. We have the
following lemma:
Lemma 2. Let Γ̂ = (I, (Si)i∈I (Vi)∈I) be a BGSS. Then ∀s, s ∈S ,
UR([s, s]) = [∧BR(s), ∨BR(s)]
Proof. Let s′ ≥ s. ∀i ∈ I, ∀ti ∈ Ti, ∨BRi(s−i)(ti) ∈ BRti(s−i)6. If ai ∈ BRti(s−i), then ∀a′i ∈ Ai,
Vi(ai, s−i, ti)≥Vi(a′i, s−i, ti). Thus, ∀a′i ∈Ai, ∃s−i ∈ [s−i, s−i] (namely s−i) such that Vi(ai, s−i, ti)≥
Vi(a′i, s−i, ti). Hence ai ∈URti([s−i, s−i]). Therefore, ∨BRi(s−i)(ti)∈URti([s−i, s−i]), hence∨BRi(s−i)∈
URti([s−i, s−i]), giving∨BRi(s−i)∨URi([s−i, s−i]), or∨BR(s)∨UR([s, s]) . Likewise, ∧UR([s,s])
∧BR(s), giving [∧BR(s), ∨BR(s)]⊆UR([s, s]).
6Our measurability and continuity assumptions ensure that BRti(s−i) is a complete lattice, see Milgrom and Shan-
non (1994) Theorem A4.
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Alternatively, let s /∈ [∧BR(s), ∨BR(s)] be such that ∨BR(s)  s. Then for some i ∈ I, and
ti ∈ Ti, ∨BRi(s)(ti)  si(ti). We see that âi ≡ (∨BRi(s)(ti))∧ (si(ti)) strictly dominates si(ti). Let
s−i ∈ [s−i,s−i]. Then
Vi(si(ti), s−i, ti)−Vi(âi, s−i, ti)≤Vi(si(ti), s−i, ti)−Vi(âi, s−i, ti)≤
Vi((si(ti))∨ (∨BRi(s)(ti)), s−i, ti)−Vi(∨BRi(s)(ti), s−i, ti)< 0
where the first inequality follows from decreasing differences of Vi in (ai,s−i), the second from
supermodularity of Vi in ai, and the third from the definition of ∨BRi(s−i). Hence [∧BR(s),
∨BR(s)]⊇UR([s, s]), giving set equality.
Definition 3. Let Γ̂ = (I, (Si)i∈I (Vi)∈I) be a BGSS, and (sn)∞n=0 ⊆ 2S a sequence of strategy
functions. Then ∀i ∈ I, and each n, m such that ∀n > m, let P(m, n) = {s j|m ≤ j ≤ n− 1}. Then
we define
∨Pi(m, n) = max(si j)
m≤ j≤n−1
and
∨P(m, n) = ∏
i∈I
∨Pi(m, n)
Similar definitions are made for ∧P(m, n).
Definition 4. Let Γ̂ = (I, (Si)i∈I (Vi)∈I) be a BGSS. Then (sk)∞k=0 ⊆ 2S is an adaptive dynamic if
∀i ∈ I, ∀K′ > 0, ∃Ki > 0, ∀ti ∈ Ti, k ≥ Ki⇒URti([∧P(K
′, k), ∨P(K′, k)])
Thus, adaptive dynamics is satisfied if eventually players choose strategies that fall within
these upper and lower bounds of previous play, regardless of the length of history they take into
consideration. Note the uniform constant Ki that each player has on each player-type. This reflects
the idea that although the player-types ti represent the beliefs of player i in different environments,
it is the player herself who eventually learns to play the game adaptively, and hence in each possible
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environment. Also note that for a given K′ > 0, by setting K = max
i
(Ki) , the above definition of
an adaptive dynamic coincides with the one given in RS
The simplest case of an adaptive dynamic is the best response dynamic, which will shown to
be a bound on all other adaptive dynamics. This process is now defined.
Definition 5. The best response dynamic starting from ∧A and ∨A are the sequences of functions
(yk)∞k=0 and (z
k)∞k=0 defined as
7
• y0 = ∧A and z0 = ∨A
• yk = ∧BR(yk−1) if k is even, yk = ∨BR(yk−1) if k is odd, and
zk = ∨BR(zk−1) if k is even, and zk = ∧BR(zk−1) if k is odd
The lower mixture and upper mixtures of (yk)∞k=0 and (z
k)∞k=0 are the sequences (x
k)∞k=0 and (x̄
k)∞k=0
defined as
• xk = yk if k is even, and xk = zk if k is odd
• xk = zk if k is even, and x̄k = yk if k is odd.
Lemma 3. Let Γ̂=(I, (Si)i∈I (Vi)∈I) be a BGSS, and (x̄k)∞k=0, (x
k)∞k=0 the upper and lower mixtures
of the best response dynamics, respectively. Then
1. The sequence (xk)∞k=0 is non-decreasing, and there exists a strategy function profile s ∈S
such that s is the pointwise limit of (xk)∞k=0.
2. The sequence (x̄k)∞k=0 is non-increasing, and there exists a strategy function profile s ∈S
such that s is the pointwise limit of (xk)∞k=0.
3. For every k, xk  xk.
Proof. Follows the same argument as in RS. Notice that because the pointwise limit of a sequence
of measurable functions from a measurable space into a metric space is measurable, we have that
s and s are profiles of measurable functions.
7Noting that∨A can be viewed as the profile of constant functions ∨Ai : Ti→ Ai, ti 7→ ∨Ai, and likewise for ∧A
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Proposition 2. Let (x̄k)∞k=0 and (x
k)∞k=0 be the upper and lower mixtures of the best response
dynamics, and s, s their respective limits, and (sk)∞k=0 another adaptive dynamic. Then,
1. ∀N ≥ 0, ∃KN ≥ 0 such that k ≥ KN ⇒ sk ∈ [xN , xN ].
2. s limin f (sk) limsup(sk) s.
3. s and s are the highest and lowest serially undominated strategies, respectively.
Proof. Follows directly from RS, using only lattice and order properties, and requires no special
treatment under our setting.
We are now ready to investigate the different solution concepts in a BGSS. We build up to one
of the main theorems, which states that the converge of best response dynamic (yk)∞k=0 or (z
k)∞k=0
is equivalent to dominance solvability, and the concept of global stability. Recall that although
the upper and lower mixtures of the best response dynamics are monotonic sequences, and thus
guaranteed to converge, this need not be the case for the best response dynamics themselves. We
therefore also provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the convergence of best response
dynamics, which relates to the fixed point of the double best response correspondence BR◦BR.
Theorem 1. Let Γ̂ = (I, (Si)i∈I (Vi)∈I) be a BGSS. Then the following are equivalent:
1. Best response dynamics starting at ∧A or ∨A converge.
2. Every adaptive dynamic converges to the same Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We see that (1) implies (2). By our previous lemma, we know that (xk)∞k=0 and (x
k)∞k=0
converge to s and s, respectively. Suppose best response dynamic starting at ∧A , (yk)∞k=0, con-
verges, the case when (zk)∞k=0 being similar. Since (y
2k)∞k=0 and (y
2k+1)∞k=0 are subsequences of
the convergent sequences (xk)∞k=0 and (x
k)∞k=0, respectively, we have that y
2k→ s, and y2k+1→ s.
Since (yk)∞k=0 converges, we must have s = s.
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Suppose s /∈ BR(s). Then ∃i ∈ I, ∃ti ∈ Ti, ∃ai ∈ Ai such that
Vi(ai, x−i, ti) =
ˆ
T−i
ui(ai, x−i(t−i), ti)d pi(t−i| ti)>
ˆ
T−i
ui(xi(ti), x−i(t−i), ti)d pi(t−i| ti) =Vi(xi(ti), x−i, ti)
By boundedness of ui, we have that the family (uki (ai, ti))
∞
k=0 defined as u
k
i (ai, ti)= ui(ai, x−i(ti), ti),
is uniformly bounded. By the continuity of ui in a−i, and the pointwise convergence of xk to x, then
for all ai ∈ Ai, Vi(ai, xk−i, ti)→Vi(ai, x−i, ti). Hence ∃K, ∀k ≥ K, Vi(ai, xk−i, ti)>Vi(xi(ti) ,xk−i , ti).
By the continuity, and hence upper semi-continuity, of Vi in ai, we have
Vi(xi(ti) ,x
k
−i , ti)≥ limn→∞sup(Vi(x
n
i (ti) ,x
k
−i , ti))≥ limn→∞(Vi(x
n
i (ti) ,x
k
−i , ti))
hence for n large, we have Vi(ai, xk−i, ti)>V (x
n
i (ti), x
k
−i, ti),∀k≥K. This implies that Vi(ai ,xk−i , ti)>
V (xk+1i (ti), x
k
−i, ti), contradiction the optimality of x
k+1
i (ti). Thus s = s is a Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium, and by our last proposition, we have that all adaptive dynamics converge to this equilibrium,
giving (2).
The fact that (2) implies (1) follows simply from the fact that the best response dynamics are
themselves adaptive dynamics.
Definition 6. A BGSS is globally stable if and only if there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
s̃ ∈S such that every adaptive dynamic converges to s̃.
Theorem 2. Let Γ̂ = (I, (Si)i∈I (Vi)∈I) be a BGSS. Then the following are equivalent:
1. Best response dynamic (yk)∞k=0 or (z
k)∞k=0 converge
2. BR◦BR has a unique fixed point
3. Γ̂ is globally stable
4. Γ̂ is dominance solvable
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Proof. Having established Proposition 2 and Theorem 1, the proof follows exactly as that in RS.
We now consider what these solution concepts offer us under the different assumptions on
beliefs, A2 and A3. Even with the single-crossing like conditions imposed on the utility functions,
the problem remains largely intractable without imposing any structure on beliefs. Intuitively, A2
stipulates that observing a higher type leads a player to put more weight on the possibility of the
other players receiving a higher type, and A3 stipulates that observing a higher type leads a player
to put more weight on the possibility of the other players receiving a lower type. In many situations
these are rather mild assumptions. Assumption A3 is studied first.
The following result is variation of the result found in Van Zandt and Vives (2007), but in the
case for BGSC, where ti is suppressed in the utility function. We will assume for the following that
for a player i of type ti, BRti is singleton valued, although the same analysis can be done for both
∨BRti and ∧BRti .
Proposition 3. If ui : A→ R satisfies supermodularity in ai, continuity in ai, and decreasing dif-
ferences in (ai, a−i), then ∀ti ∈ Ti, Vi(·, s−i, ti) =
´
T−i
ui(·, s−i(t−i))d pi(t−i| ti) is supermodular and
continuous in ai, and satisfies decreasing differences in (ai, s−i). Furthermore, under assumption
A3, if s−i ∈S−i is a profile of monotone non-decreasing strategies, then pi(t−i| t ′i)≥FOSD pi(t−i| ti),
BRt ′i (s−i)≥ BRti(s−i)).
Proof. Since supermodularity, continuity, and decreasing differences carry through integration, it
follows that Vi(·, s−i, ti) satisfies supermodularity in ai, and decreasing differences in (ai, s−i).
Now, suppose ui satisfies decreasing differences in (ai, a−i), and s−i ∈S−i a profile of monotone
non-decreasing strategies. The decreasing differences of ui in (ai, a−i) implies that ui(ai, s−i(t−i))
satisfies decreasing differences in (ai, t−i). Let aHi  aLi and pi(t−i| ti) ≥FOSD pi(t−i| t
′
i). Define
h(t−i) = ui(aHi , s−i(t−i))−ui(aLi , si(t−i)), which is non-increasing in t−i. By FOSD,
V (aHi , s−i, t
′)−V (aLi , s−i, t ′) =
ˆ
T−i
h(t−i)d pi(t−i| t ′i)≥
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ˆ
T−i
h(t−i)d pi(t−i| ti) =V (aHi , s−i, ti)−V (aLi , s−i, ti)
giving increasing differences in (ai, ti). By the monotonicity theorem, BRt ′i (s−i) ≥Ai BRti(s−i),
giving BRi(s−i; P′i )≥ BRi(s−i; Pi).
It follows immediately from the above proposition that since best response dynamics begin
at monotone non-decreasing strategies ∧A and ∨A, assumption A3 implies that the set of Nash
equilibria is bounded above and below by serially undominated strategies which are monotone
non-decreasing. Furthermore, if best response dynamics converge, there is a unique equilibrium
which is monotone non-decreasing. It is natural to ask about what can be said if best response
dynamics cannot be guaranteed to converge. Under additional assumptions, a monotone non-
decreasing Bayesian Nash equilibrium can still be guaranteed to exist, which is now shown. We
will say that (Ti, Fi, µi,≥Ti) is an admissible probability space if the following conditions hold:
1. (Ti, di) is a separable metric space, Fi the corresponding Borel sigma algebra, and µi is any
probability measure on Ti.
2. ≥Ti is a partial order on Ti such that the sets {(a, b) ∈ T 2i |b≥Tia} are measurable in the
product sigma algebra.
3. Every atomless set A ∈Fi such that µi(A)> 0 contains two strictly ordered points.8
When Rn is ordered with the vector ordering, µi is the associated Lebesque measure, and Ti is any
cube in Rn with positive finite measure, then these conditions are automatically satisfied,9 as well
as when Ti is any interval on the real line. Define Mi = { f : Ti → Ai| f non-decreasing}. It can
be shown10 that if (Ti, Fi, µi,≥Ti) is an admissible probability space, and Ai satisfies A1, each
function f ∈Mi is equal µi−a.e. to a measurable, non-decreasing function. Furthermore, under a
8We say that two points x and x′are strictly ordered iff there exist disjoint open sets U 3 x and U ′ 3 x′ such that for
all (y, z) ∈U×U ′, z≥ y.
9See the Steinhaus Theorem.
10see Reny (2011)
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metric δi : Mi×Mi→R+11, (Mi, δi) is a compact metric space such that δi( fn, f )→ 0 if and only
if dAi( fn(ti), f (ti))→ 0 for µi−a.e. We then have the following theorem:
Theorem 3. Let Γ̂ = (I, (Si)i∈I (Vi)∈I) be a BGSS. If ∀i ∈ I, (Ti, Fi, µi,≥Ti) is an admissible
probability space, Ai is convex, satisfies A1, Pi satisfies A3, and each pi(·| ti) ∈ Pi is absolutely
continuous with respect to the product measure µ−i :
⊗
j 6=i
F j→ [0,1]. Then if each BRti : S−i→ Ai
is singleton-valued and pointwise continuous,12 there exists a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equi-
librium which is a profile of monotone non-decreasing strategies, and the set of Bayesian Nash
equilibria is bounded above and below by serially undominated strategies which are also profiles
of monotone non-decreasing strategies.
Proof. As above, A3 automatically implies that the extremal serially undominated strategies are
monotone, and since ∀i ∈ I, (Ti, Fi, µi,≥Ti) is an admissible probability space, A1 and convex-
ity of Ai implies that every monotone function fi in the compact, convex space (Mi, δi) is equal
µi-a.e. to a measurable monotone function f̃i. Let f−i ∈ M−i, and f̃−i be the measurable rep-
resentative that f−i is µ−i-a.e. equal to. Since ∀ti ∈ Ti, pi(·| ti) is absolutely continuous with
respect to µ−i, f−i is pi(·| ti)-a.e. equal to f̃−i, and thus by Proposition 1.17, BRi : M−i → Mi
is well defined. Now let ( f n−i)
∞
n=1 ⊆ M−i be such that f n−i → f−i under the product metric δ−i.
Then by above, f n−i → f−i µ−i-a.e, and hence pi(·| ti)-a.e., ∀ti. By continuity of BRti , we have
lim
n→∞
(BRi( f n−i)(ti)) ≡ limn→∞(BRi(
˜f n−i)(ti)) = limn→∞
(BRti( ˜f
n
−i−i)) = BRti( f̃−i) ≡ BRi( f̃−i)(ti)), giving
continuity of BRi. Hence BR : M→ M is a singleton-valued continuous mapping from the com-
pact, convex, metric space (M, δ ) into itself, and therefore by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem,13
Fix(BR)∩M is non-empty and compact, giving the result.
We now consider a wide class of games when beliefs satisfy the assumption A3. In this case,
there are two effects that determine the monotonicity of a best response for player i to a strategy s−i.
11For f , f ′∈M, define δi( fn, f ) =
´
Ti
dAi( fn(ti), f (ti))dµi.
12sn−i→ s−i pointwise pi(·|ti) a.e. ⇒BRti(sn−i)→ BRti(s−i).
13If K is a non-empty, compact, convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff space, and f : K→ K is continuous,
then Fix( f ) is non-empty and compact.
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Suppose that s−i : T−i→ A−i is a profile of monotone non-decreasing strategies. The competing
effects are the following:
• By assumption, ui has increasing differences between (ai, ti). Hence when considering
Vi(ai, s−i, ti) =
´
ui(ai, s−i(t−i), ti)d pi(t−i| ti), as ti increases, the direct effect of this increase
through the utility function ui induces player i to take a higher strategy.
• By assumption, ui has decreasing differences in (ai, a−i), or, in consideration of the interim
expected utility above, because s−i is monotone increasing, ui has decreasing differences in
(ai, t−i). Therefore, as ti rises to t ′i , through the first order stochastic dominance order, t−i has
a higher expected value as pi(·| ti) increases to pi(·| t ′i), therefore the decreasing differences
in (ai, t−i) induces player i to take a lower strategy.
In many applications, the direct and indirect effect appear either additively or multiplicatively in
the best response. For example, suppose that player i′s best response function can be written as
BRti(s−i) = g(ti)−α( ∑
j 6=i
E(s−i |ti)), where α ≥ 0 and g(·) is an increasing function of ti, as in our
Cournot game. Then, as illustrated in the graphic below, in a two player game, if s2 is a non-
decreasing strategy, it is seen how g(·) captures the direct effect from the increasing differences in
(a1, t1) , and α(E(s2| t1)) the indirect effect from the first order stochastic dominance assumption
on beliefs through the higher expected value of s2.
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The next theorem gives us sufficient conditions to guarantee the monotonicity of extremal
equilibria in many applications, where Ti and Ai are subsets of the real line, by capturing the direct
and indirect effects of the best response dynamics. Suppose for the following Theorem that each
Ai ⊆ R+.
Theorem 4. Let Γ̂ = (I, (Si)i∈I (Vi)∈I) be a BGSS. Suppose that for all i ∈ I, and ti ∈ Ti best
responses can be written as
BRti(s−i) = gi(ti)− vi(ti)(∑
j 6=i
E(s j| ti))
where vi is a non-negative function of ti.14 Define zi : Ti→ Ai, ti 7→ BRti(g−i(·)). Then, if ∀i ∈ I,
1. vi and zi are non-decreasing functions of ti, then best response dynamics starting from a pro-
file of non-decreasing strategies is a sequence whose every even term is a profile of monotone
non-decreasing strategies. Likewise, if vi and zi are non-increasing functions of ti, then best
response dynamics starting from a profile of non-increasing strategies is a sequence whose
every even term is a profile of monotone non-increasing strategies.
2. In addition, suppose v(ti)≡α ≥ 0. If zi is monotone non-decreasing, best response dynamics
starting from a profile of non-decreasing strategies is a sequence whose every odd term is
a profile of monotone non-decreasing strategies. Likewise, best response dynamics starting
from a profile of non-increasing strategies is a sequence whose every odd term is a profile of
monotone non-increasing strategies.
3. If (1) or (2) are true, then if best response dynamics starting from a profile of monotone
non-decreasing (increasing) strategies converges, they converge to a profile of monotone
non-decreasing (increasing) strategies.
Proof. The proof is done in the case of starting from a profile of monotone non-decreasing strate-
gies, the other case being similar. Suppose the condition in (1) holds, and consider best response
14This ensures that best responses are non-increasing in opponents’ strategies, the defining property of a BGSS.
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dynamics starting from s ≡ BR0(s), a profile of monotone non-decreasing strategies. Suppose for
k ≥ 2 even, BRk−2(s) is a profile of monotone non-decreasing strategies. Then
BRti(BR
k−1
−i (s)) = gi(ti)− vi(ti)((∑
j 6=i
E(BRk−1j (s))| ti)) =
gi(ti)− vi(ti)(∑
j 6=i
E((g j(t j)− v j(t j)( ∑
m 6= j
E(BRk−2m | t j)| ti) =
g(ti)− v(ti)(∑
j 6=i
E(g j(t j)| ti))+ vi(ti)(∑
j 6=i
∑E
m6= j
(v j(t j)E(BRk−2m | t j)| ti)
Therefore,
BRt ′i (BR
k−1
−i (s))−BRti(BR
k−1
−i (s)) =
(gi(t ′i)−gi(ti))− (vi(t ′i)∑
j 6=i
E(g j(t j)| t ′i)− vi(ti)∑
j 6=i
E(g j(t j)| ti))
+vi(t ′i)(∑
j 6=i
∑E(
m 6= j
v j(t j)E(BRk−2m | t j)| t ′i))− vi(ti)(∑
j 6=i
∑E(
m 6= j
v j(t j)E(BRk−2m | t j)| ti))
Since each BRk−2m is non-decreasing, by FOSD we have that E(BR
k−2
m | t j) is a non-decreasing
function of t j. Since v(·) is non-decreasing and non-negative, then v j(t j)E(BRk−2m | t j) is a non-
decreasing function of t j. Again, by FOSD, E(v(t j)E(BRk−2m | t j)| ti) is a non-decreasing function
of ti, giving the non-negativity of the right-hand side. The left hand side is non-negative by hy-
pothesis, hence ∀k ≥ 0 even, BRki (s) is non-decreasing, or BRk(s) is a profile of non-decreasing
strategies.
Now suppose that the condition in (2) holds, and consider best response dynamics starting
from s ≡ BR0(s), a monotone non-increasing strategy. Then ∀i ∈ I, ∀ti ∈ Ti, BRti(s−i) = g(ti)−
α ∑
j 6=i
E(s j| ti), thus BRt ′i (s−i)−BRti(s−i) = (g(t
′
i)−g(ti))−α( ∑
j 6=i
E(s j| t ′i)− ∑
j 6=i
E(s j| ti)). By FOSD,
we have that since s is a profile of non-increasing strategies, the right hand side is non-negative,
and clearly the left hand side is. Hence BR1(s) is a profile on monotone non-decreasing strategies.
Suppose that for k ≥ 2 odd, BRk−1(s) is a profile of monotone non-decreasing strategies. Then
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∀i ∈ I, ∀ti ∈ Ti,
BRti(BR
k
−i) = g(ti)−α∑
j 6=i
E(BRkj| ti) =
g(ti)−α∑
j 6=i
E(g(t)−α ∑
m6= j
E(BRk−1m | t j)| ti) =
g(ti)−α∑
j 6=i
E(g(t)| ti)+α2(∑
j 6=i
∑E(
m6= j
E(BRk−2m | t j)| ti))
Therefore, for t ′i > ti,
BRt ′i (BR
k
−i)−BRti(BR
k
−i) =
(g(t ′i)−g(ti))−α(∑
j 6=i
E(g(t)| t ′i)−∑
j 6=i
E(g(t)| ti)) =
+α2(∑
j 6=i
∑E(
m6= j
E(BRk−2m | t j)| t ′i)−∑
j 6=i
∑E(
m 6= j
E(BRk−2m | t j)| ti))
By a similar argument used in (1), from the fact that BRk−2m is monotone non-decreasing and by
FOSD, the right hand side is non-negative, and the left hand side is by assumption. Therefore,
∀k ≥ 0 odd, BRk(s) is a profile of monotone non-decreasing strategies.
For (3) , assume that (1) holds, and that best response dynamics (BRk(s))∞k=0 starting from
s ∈S monotone non-decreasing converges to a function ŝ ∈S . Then ∀i ∈ I, ∀ti ∈ Ti, BRki (ti)→
ŝi(ti). Because (BR2ki (ti))
∞
k=0 is a subsequence of the convergent sequence (BR
k
i (ti))
∞
k=0, we have
that ∀ti ∈ Ti, ŝi(ti) = lim
k→∞
(BR2ki (ti)). Since ∀k ≥ 0, t ′i > ti ⇒ BR2ki (t ′i) ≥ BR2ki (ti), it follows that
ŝi(t ′i) ≥ ŝi(ti) and hence ŝ is a profile of monotone non-decreasing strategies. A similar argument
holds if (2) holds.
It is easily seen that under (2), zi being monotone non-decreasing is also a necessary condition
if the types for player i have homogenous beliefs. The condition can be interpreted as ensuring that
even when a player best responds only to the direct effect of a strategy profile, the result will be
a monotone non-decreasing strategy, implying that when the indirect effect is taken into account,
the result will still be a monotone non-decreasing strategy. The next Corollary connects this result
with the solution concepts offered by GAD.
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Corollary 1. If (1) or (2) hold, then the upper and lower best response mixtures starting from ∨A
and ∧A, (x̄k)∞k=0 and (xk)∞k=0, are profiles whose every even/odd term are monotone non-decreasing
strategies, respectively. If best response dynamics converge, the upper and lower mixtures converge
to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium profile of monotone non-decreasing strategies.
Proof. Follows immediately from the last theorem, the fact that ∨A and ∧A are profiles of constant,
and hence monotone non-decreasing/increasing strategies, and the definition of the upper and lower
best response dynamic mixtures.
Corollary 2. If (2) holds, then there exists a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium which is a profile
of monotone non-decreasing strategies if and only if α ∈ [0, 1).
Proof. For each ti ∈Ti, define E0(g−i| ti)= 0, E1(g−i| ti)= ∑
j 6=i
E(g j| ti), E2(g−i| ti)= ∑
j 6=i
∑
m 6= j
E(E(gm| t j)| ti),
and in general, Ek(g−i| ti) = ∑
j 6=i
E(E j−1(g− j| t j)| ti), where t j is a specific realization of the variable
t j. Then
BR1ti(∨A) = gi(ti)+E
0(g−i| ti)−α(N−1)∨A
Suppose for k > 0,
BRkti(∨A) = gi(ti)+
k−1
∑
n=1
(−1)nαnEn(g−i| ti)+(−1)kαk(N−1)∨A
Then
BRk+1ti (∨A) = gi(ti)−α∑
j 6=i
E(g j(·)+
k−1
∑
n=1
(−1)nαnEn(g− j| t j)+(−1)kαk(N−1)∨A)| ti) =
gi(ti)+
k
∑
n=1
(−1)nαnEn(g−i| ti)+(−1)k+1αk+1(N−1)∨A
Likewise, for any k ≥ 0,
BRkti(∧A) = gi(ti)+
k−1
∑
n=1
(−1)nαnEn(g−i| ti)+(−1)kαk(N−1)∧A
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Thus, for any k ≥ 0, ||BRkti(∨A)− BR
k
ti(∧A)|| = α
k(N − 1)(∨A−∧A), and thus we see that as
k→ ∞, best response dynamics starting from ∨A and ∧A converge, giving the result.
Example 4. n-Player Cournot, continuum of types. Consider the n-player extension of the
original Cournot game that was presented, but this time with a continuum of types given by Ti =
[0, c). Suppose that beliefs are given by the exponential distribution, with cdf F(x, ti) = 1− 1ti e
−x
ti ,
where x > 0. It is straightforward to check that t ′i > ti⇒ F(·, t ′i)≥FOSD F(·, ti). The best response
function for player-type ti is given by
BRti(s−i) = (
a− c+ ti
2b
)− 1
2 ∑j 6=i
E(s j|ti)
where g(ti) = (a−c+ti2b ). Since the mean of the exponential distribution is ti, we have that ∀i ∈ I and
t
′
i > ti,
BRt ′i
(g−i)−BRti(g−i) =
(
n+1
4b
)
(t ′i − ti)> 0
and thus a unique monotone non-decreasing BNE can be guaranteed.
1.4 Monotone Comparative Statics
We now consider what happens to the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria if the beliefs of each player-
type have an upward shift in first order stochastic dominance. Letting P = ((p(t−i| ti))i∈I,ti∈Ti, we
say P′ ≥FOSD P if ∀i ∈ I, ∀ti ∈ Ti, p′i(t−i| ti) ≥FOSD pi(t−i| ti). Just as in the case of establishing
the monotonicity of a best response, in BGSS there are two competing effects as to whether or not
such an upward shift will produce a higher or lower equilibrium. Again, monotonicity of the initial
profile plays a crucial role. The competing effects in this case can be summarized as follows:
Let s ∈S be an initial profile of strategies in a BGSS. Then,
1. If s is monotone non-increasing, as P′ ≥FOSD P, by Proposition 1, each player will want to
choose a higher response. Again from Proposition 1, because of the decreasing differences in
a (ai, s−i) each player will subsequently want to take a lower response, producing competing
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effects. This is in contrast to BGSC, where the increasing differences in (ai, s−i) would
augment the initial higher response with another higher response (albeit in the case where s
is non-decreasing).
2. If s is monotone non-decreasing, as P′ ≥FOSD P, each player will want to choose a lower
response. The deceasing differences in (ai,s−i) subsequently leads players to choose a higher
response, producing competing effects, and in contrast to BGSC where we would again get
augmenting effects, but again in the case when s is monotone non-decreasing.
To determine which of the two effects dominates, we use Schauder’s fixed point theorem.
As is well known, when trying to apply a fixed point theorem in a function space (such as with
S ), there is a natural tension between finding a topology small enough to support compact order
intervals, and large enough to retain the continuity of the best response function, and hence any
such argument must be taken on a case by case basis. Despite this, in the next theorem we assume
both the compactness of order intervals [s, s], and the continuity of the best response, and then
discuss some simple situations where these are automatically satisfied.
Theorem 5. Let Γ̂ = (I, (Si)i∈I (Vi)∈I) be a BGSS, and BR : S →S be continuous. Let P′ ≥ P,
and s ∈ NE(P). Then,
1. If s is monotone non-increasing, and BR(BR(s, P′)) ≥ s, there exists ŝ ∈ NE(P′) such that
ŝ≥ s.
2. If s is monotone non-decreasing and s ≥ BR(BR(s, P′)), there exists ŝ ∈ NE(P′) such that
s≥ ŝ.
Proof. We prove 1, the proof for 2 being nearly identical. Let s ∈ NE(P) be monotone non-
increasing. By Proposition 3, each player-type ti will choose a higher action given a higher belief,
hence BR is non-decreasing in P, giving BR(s, P′) ≥ BR(s, P) = s. Now let s′ ∈ [s, BR(s, P′)].
Since BR(s, P′) ≥ s′,BR(s, P′) ≥ BR(BR(s, P′)) ≥ s, where the first inequality follows from non-
increasingness in s, and the second from the condition in the theorem. Also, since s′≥ s, BR(s, P′)≥
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BR(s′, P′). Hence BR([s, BR(s, P′)],P′)⊆ [s, BR(s, P′)]. By continuity and the fact that [s, BR(s, P′)]
is compact, Schauder’s fixed point theorem guarantees some ŝ∈ NE(P′)∩ [s, BR(s, P′)], giving the
result.
Consider the conditions of Theorem 3. Recalling that (M, δ ) was guaranteed to be compact, we see
that if we replace [s, BR(s, P′)] with [s, BR(s, P′)]∩M in the above proof, then [s, BR(s, P′)]∩M is
compact. Therefore, under these conditions, we can always do monotone comparative statics. Or-
der intervals cannot be guaranteed to be compact, in general. However, if each Ti is countable, then
by considering the topology of pointwise convergence τpi ,
15 if Ai is metrizable, it follows that τpi
is, 16 and is thus Hausdorff and also first countable, allowing us to characterize continuity through
sequential convergence. Si is clearly convex, and order intervals [s, s] are compact.17 Hence, if
best responses are pointwise continuous, such as the form BRti(s−i) = g(ti)− v(ti)( ∑
j 6=i
E(s−i|ti))
given in Theorem 4, the conditions of Theorem 5 can be applied.
To see why the monotonicity of the initial equilibrium is important, consider the following
graphical representation of a symmetric game where the initial beliefs for t1i and t
2
i and the initial
Bayesian Nash equilibrium are represented by solid lines, and the new beliefs and equilibrium are
represented by dotted lines:
15Recall that each si can be viewed as an element of Ai ≡ ∏
ti∈Ti
Ai, and τpi is the restriction to Si of the corresponding
product topology τAi restricted to Si ⊆ A
Ti
i
16∀ f ,g ∈Si,di( f , g) =
∞
∑
j=1
2− j d j( f (t j),g(t j))1+d j( f (t j),g(t j))
17Because each [s(ti), s(ti)] is compact, by the Tychonoff product theorem, [s, s] = ∏
ti∈Ti
[s(ti), s(ti)] is also.
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As the belief structure P changes to P′, both types’ beliefs increase in FOSD. Note, however,
that when viewing the old equilibrium profile, type t1i sees unambiguously lower strategies being
played by her opponents, and therefore best responds by playing higher by GSS. Type t2i , on the
other hand, sees unambiguously higher actions being played by her opponents, and best responds
by playing lower by GSS. Therefore, the new equilibrium is neither higher nor lower than the old
equilibrium, and monotone comparative statics cannot be guaranteed.
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Chapter 2
Global Games Selection in Games with
Strategic Substitutes or Complements
2.1 Introduction
The global games method serves as an equilibrium selection device for complete information
games by embedding them into a class of Bayesian games that exhibit unique equilibrium pre-
dictions. This method was pioneered by Carlsson and Van Damme (CvD) (1993) for the case of
2-player, 2-action coordination games. In that paper, a complete information game with multiple
equilibria is considered, and instead of players observing a specific parameter in the model directly,
they observe noisy signals about the parameter, transforming it into a Bayesian game. As the sig-
nals become more precise, a unique serially undominated Bayesian prediction emerges, resolving
the original issue of multiplicity by delivering a unique prediction in a slightly “noisy” version of
the original complete information game. This method has since been extended by Frankel, Mor-
ris, and Pauzner (FMP) (2003) to multiple-player, multiple-action games of strategic complements
(GSC), where a higher action from opponents induces a player to also best respond with a higher
action. Although this framework encompasses many useful applications, it deviates from that of
CvD by requiring the underlying parameter space to produce two “dominance regions” instead of
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possibly just one. That is, if high parameter values correspond to the highest action being strictly
dominant for all players and vice versa for low parameter values, then as long as some extra as-
sumptions on preferences hold, a unique global games prediction emerges as signals become less
and less noisy.
Little work in this area has been done in games of strategic substitutes (GSS), where a higher
action from opponents induces a player to take a lower action. Morris and Shin (2009) show that
this case can be much more complex by giving an example of a global game in the GSS setting
which fails to produce a unique outcome from the process of iterated elimination of strictly dom-
inated strategies (IESDS). Harrison (2003) studies a model where this difficulty can be overcome
by considering 2-action aggregative GSS with sufficiently heterogeneous players and two overlap-
ping dominance regions. Still, the global games solution can only be guaranteed to be a unique
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, not necessarily the dominance solvable solution.
This chapter develops a global games framework which not only allows for the underlying
game to be either a GSS or a GSC, but is also much less demanding than both FMP and Harrison
in terms of the restrictions that preferences and the underlying parameter space must satisfy. For
example, we require the existence of only one dominance region, which need not correspond to
the highest or the lowest strategies in the action space. This is opposed to the requirement of two
dominance regions, which, as the motivating example in Section 2 illustrates, is often not met.
We also dispense of a state monotonicity assumption on preferences which is present in both FMP
and Harrison, so that observing a higher parameter need not induce a player to take a higher strat-
egy. Our approach is to directly extend the original 2× 2 framework of CvD to multiple-player,
multiple-action games by drawing on a common order property present in both GSS and GSC,
while also overcoming the computational difficulties present in Harrison by using IESDS as our
solution concept. In their original work, CvD use a “risk dominance” criteria to determine which
equilibrium will be selected as the global games prediction. We are able to generalize this condi-
tion to a p−dominance condition which includes theirs as a special case. As in FMP, we also give
conditions for when a global games prediction is “noise independent”, so that it is robust to the
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specification of the prior distribution on the parameter space. In fact, our p−dominance condition
for selection is similar to the one given in FMP as a sufficient condition for noise independence,
and equivalent in games with symmetric payoffs.
Lastly, our p−dominance condition for selection becomes more restrictive as the number of
players grows larger. This can be motivated by the idea in the presence of more opponents and
subsequently more actions to consider, a player must be more sure that a specific equilibrium is
being played in order for her to reciprocate uniquely by playing her part in the equilibrium. In
order to overcome this difficulty, we allow for the possibility that instead of a player believing that
her opponents’ information is independent conditional on her own information, she may instead
perceive some correlation in the information of “groups” of others. This effectively reduces the
amount of uncertainty present in the game, and in some situations may restore the full power of the
2−player p−dominance condition even in the presence of an arbitrarily large amount of players.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a motivating example which highlights
the contributions of this chapter in relation to the current literature. Section 3 lays out the ba-
sic model and assumptions, and presents the first of three main results. Section 4 introduces the
grouping method which allows us to relax the assumption of conditionally independent beliefs,
and generalizes the results in Section 3. Section 5 presents the results for noise independence and
common valuations.
2.2 Motivating Example
Because our model is one of the first to address global games analysis in finite GSS, we use the
following motivating example to highlight the contributions to the well-established literature in the
GSC setting. Consider a slightly modified version of the technology adoption model considered
in Keser, Suleymanova, and Wey (2012). Three agents must mutually decide on whether to adopt
an inferior technology A, or a superior technology B. The benefit to each player i of adopting a
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specific technology t = A, B is given by
Ut(Nt) = vt + γt(Nt−1)
where Nt is the total number of players using technology t, vt is the stand-alone benefit from using
technology t, and γt is the benefit derived from the network effect of adopting the technology of
others. It is assumed that vB > vA in order to distinguish B as the superior technology. Assume for
simplicity that vA = γA = 1, and γB = 3. Letting vB = x, we have the following payoff matrix:
A P3 B
P2 P2
A B A B
P1
A 3, 3, 3 2, x, 2
P1
A 2, 2, x 1, x+3, x+3
B x, 2, 2 x+3, x+3, 1 B x+3, 1, x+3 x+6, x+6, x+6
For x ∈ [1, 3], both (A, A, A) and (B, B, B) are strict Nash equilibria, and for x > 3 we have
that (B, B, B) is the strictly dominant action profile, giving an “upper dominance region”. Suppose
that a modeler wishes to use the global games approach to resolving the issue of multiplicity on
[1, 3]: By allowing each player i to observe only a noisy signal xi = x+ vεi of the true parameter
x, we obtain a Bayesian game with noise parameter v. FMP show that under certain assumptions,
GSC like the game above eventually exhibit an “essentially unique” Bayesian prediction s : R→ A
as the noise parameter v→ 0. That is, when noise is arbitrarily small about an observation x, the
corresponding complete information game is approximated and we have a unique “global games
prediction” given by s(x).
However, notice that because we have the parameter restriction x = vB > vA = 1, no lower dom-
inance region can be established,1 and therefore the framework of FMP cannot be applied. One
possible resolution of this problem has been given in Basteck, Daniëls, and Heinemann (2013),
which shows that any GSC can be re-parametrized so that two dominance regions are established
1Likewise, if common knowledge about vA is relaxed, no upper dominance region would be established.
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and the conditions of FMP are met, producing a subsequent global games prediction. But this pro-
cedure can also be problematic, due to a recent observation by Weinstein and Yildiz (WY) (2007).
In games of incomplete information, rationality arguments rely on analyzing a player’s hierarchy
of beliefs, that is, their belief about the parameter space, what they believe their opponents believe
about the parameter space, and so on. In general situations, this information can be identified
as a player’s type, or beliefs over the parameter space and the types of others. WY shows that
if the parameter space is “rich” enough, so that any given rationalizable strategy a∗i for player i
is strictly dominant at some parameter in the model, then the (degenerate) complete information
beliefs can be slightly perturbed in such a way so as to make a∗i the unique rationalizable action
for player i. This poses a serious criticism to global games analysis: If players’ beliefs can be
slightly perturbed in a specific way so that any rationalizable strategy can be justified as the unique
rationalizable strategy, how does a modeler know if the global games method is the “right way”?
Notice that a re-parametrization of the above model à la Basteck, Daniëls, and Heinemann which
produces upper and lower dominance regions automatically satisfies the richness condition of WY,
making the global games selection ad hoc in this case.
By relaxing the need for two dominance regions, as well as requiring no state monotonicity
assumptions, our framework allows us to expand global games analysis to cases like the one above
by allowing for a more “natural” way to add uncertainty to the model. That is, by avoiding an
arbitrary re-parametrization, we can use those parameters which are motivated in the description
of the model itself, in this case vB or vA.
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2.3 Model and Assumptions
The chapter will be stated in the case of GSS. When it is needed, the adjustments that are
necessary for the results to hold for GSC will be pointed out.
Definition 7. A game G = (I , (Ai)i∈I , (ui)i∈I ) of strategic substitutes has the following ele-
ments:
• The number of players is finite and given by the set I = {1, 2, ..., N}.
• Each player i’s action set is denoted by Ai and is finite and linearly ordered. Let ai and ai
denote the largest and the smallest elements in Ai, respectively. Also, for a specific ãi ∈ Ai,
denote ã+i = {ai ∈ Ai |ai > ãi} and ã
−
i = {ai ∈ Ai | ãi > ai}.
• Each player’s utility function is given by ui : A→ R, and is continuous in all arguments.
• (Strategic Substitutes) For each player i, if a′i ≥ ai and a
′
−i ≥ a−i, then
ui(ai, a
′
−i)−ui(a
′
i, a
′
−i)≥ ui(ai, a−i)−ui(a
′
i, a−i)
We will restrict our attention to games that exhibit multiple equilibria, and will require that the
specific equilibrium under consideration is “strict” in the following sense:
Definition 8. Let ã be a Nash equilibrium. Then ã is a strict Nash equilibrium if for all i, and for
all ai,
ui(ãi, ã−i)> ui(ai, ã−i)
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Simply, a Nash equilibrium is strict if each player is best responding uniquely to the other players
when they play their part of the equilibrium. In order to resolve the issue of multiple equilibria
in games where a specific ã ∈ A is a strict Nash equilibrium, we will need to “embed” such a
game into a family of games such that ã is a strict Nash equilibrium on some neighboring range of
parameters.
Definition 9. An ã−based parametrized game of strategic substitutes GX =(I , X , (Ai)i∈I, (ui)i∈I)
has the following elements:
• ∀x ∈R, we denote GX(x) to be the unparametrized game when x is realized. We assume that
for all x, GX(x) is a game of strategic substitutes. Also, denote by NEX(x) the set of strict
Nash equilibria in GX(x).
• X = [X , X ] is a closed interval of R such that ∀x ∈ X , ã ∈ NEX(x). We also make the
following convention that ∀x ≥ X , ui(a, x) = ui(a, X), and likewise ∀x ≤ X , ui(a, x) =
ui(a, X).2
• ∀i ∈I , ∀a ∈ A, ui(a, ·) : R→ R is a continuous function of x.
With the addition of a noise structure, a parametrized game of strategic substitutes becomes a
Bayesian game. We will call a Bayesian game a global game if it has the specific noise structure
defined below, and has the payoff properties as defined in Definition 9.
2Because our analysis will be focused on the interior of X , this is only for simplicity.
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Definition 10. A global game G(v) = (GX , f , (ϕi)i∈I ) is a Bayesian game with the following
elements:
• GX is an ã-based parametrized game of strategic substitutes for some ã ∈ A.
• f : R→ [0, 1] is any continuous pdf with connected support.
• {ϕi}i∈I are uniform densities with support [−1, 1], where
(
f , {ϕi}i∈I
)
are mutually indepen-
dent.
• Each player i receives a signal xi = x+ vεi, where x is distributed according to f and each
εi is distributed according to ϕi. After Bayesian updating, players form a pdf over payoff
parameters and the signals received by opponents, which is given by fi(·|xi, v) :R×RN−1→
[0, 1], with support3
supp( fi(·|xi, v))⊆ [xi− v, xi + v]× [xi−2v, xi +2v]N−1
We let Fi(·|xi, v) denote the corresponding cdf, and µFi denote the Lebesgue–Stieltjes mea-
sure induced by Fi(·|xi, v).4
Note that each global game G(v) is characterized by the noise level v of the signal the players
receive. In order to resolve multiplicity at any x ∈ X (at which ã is a strict Nash equilibrium),
the following process can then be followed: At each noise level v, the upper and lower serially
undominated strategies s̄v and sv can be calculated.5 Suppose that as v→ 0, the upper and lower
serially undominated strategies agree, so that for each x, s(x) ≡ s̄v(x) = sv(x) provides a unique
3Since xi = x+ vεi and x j = x+ vε j, x j = xi− vεi + vε j.
4That is, the unique measure on R×RN−1 such that ∀−→x = (x, x−i)∈R×RN−1, Fi(−→x |xi, v) = µFi((−∞,
−→x ]|xi, v).
5In Hoffmann (2014) it is established that any Bayesian game of strategic substitutes has a smallest and a largest
strategy profile surviving iterated deletion of dominated strategies.
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prediction in a slightly noisy version of the complete information game GX(x). Because this noise
can be made arbitrarily small, we will be justified in choosing this equilibrium in the complete
information game.
Once the signal is received, player i chooses a strategy, hence forming a strategy function
si : R→ Ai. We denote all of player i′s strategy functions by the set Si. Player i’s expected utility
from playing strategy ai against the strategy function s−i after receiving xi is given by
πx,x−i(ai, s−i, xi) =
ˆ
RN−1
ˆ
R
ui(ai, s−i(x−i), x)dµFi(x−i, x|xi, v)
In order to analyze G(v), it will be useful to analyze a simplified version G∗(v) which is
described below.
Definition 11. For any global game G(v), the simplified global game G∗(v) is defined as in
Definition 10 with the following alterations:
• f ∗ : R→ [0, 1] is distributed uniformly on some interval containing [X−2v, X̄ +2v].
• ∀i ∈I , ∀a ∈ A, ui(a, ·) depends only on the signal xi received, and not the underlying state
x.
Therefore, if F∗i (x, x−i|xi, v) is the corresponding cdf over (x, x−i) after receiving xi and F∗i (x−i|xi, v)
is the corresponding marginal cdf, then by denoting µ∗Fi as the measure induced by F
∗
i (x−i|xi, v),
player i’s expected utility from playing strategy ai against the strategy function s−i after receiving
xi in G∗(v) is given by
πx−i(ai, s−i, xi) =
ˆ
RN−1
ui(ai, s−i(x−i), xi)dµ∗Fi(x−i|xi, v)
35
We will proceed by establishing all results for a simplified global game G∗(v), and then
show in Section 5 that these results can be extended to the underlying G(v). To simplify notation,
we let4ui(a
′
i, ai, a−i, x) = ui(a
′
i, a−i, x)−ui(ai, a−i, x) be player i′s advantage of playing a
′
i over
ai when facing a−i at a given x . Similarly, we write 4πx−i(a
′
i, ai, s−i, x) for player i’s expected
advantage from playing a
′
i against s−i after receiving signal x.
Much of our analysis will involve characterizing the set of serially undominated strategies
in a global game.
Definition 12. Let G∗(v) be a simplified global game. For each player i ∈ I , and each ai ∈ Ai,
define the following:
• Pv,0i,ai = /O, S
v,0
i = Si
• ∀n > 0,
Pv,ni,ai = {x ∈ X |∀a
′
i ∈ Ai, ∀s−i ∈S
v,n−1
−i ,4πx−i(ai, a
′
i, s−i, x)> 0},
S v,ni = {si ∈S
v,n−1
i |∀ai, si |Pv,ni,ai
= ai}
• Pvi,ai = ∪n≥0P
v,n
i,ai , S
v
i = ∩n≥0S
v,n
i
It is an easy fact to check that for each ai and each n, P
v,n
i,ai ⊆P
v,n+1
i,ai , S
v,n+1
i ⊆S
v,n
i , and that
the set of serially undominated strategies for player i in a global game is a subset of the set S vi .
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P-dominance
In their 2× 2 formulation, CvD show that the “risk dominant” equilibrium will be the
one that is selected in the global games procedure. In multiple-player, multiple-action games this
notion can be extended to p−dominance, which we now define.6
Definition 13. Let ã be a Nash equilibrium at some x ∈ R. Then ã is p(x)−dominant, where
p(x) = (p1(x), p2(x), ..., pN(x)), if for each player i, pi(x) is the smallest value satisfying
li(ai, λi, x)≡∑
a−i
4ui(ãi, ai, a−i, x)λi(a−i)≥ 0
for each ai ∈ Ai and λi ∈4(A−i) such that λi(ã−i)≥ pi(x).
Taking the smallest of all such values is natural because any value larger than pi(x) will also
satisfy the definition. It will also be useful to recast Definition 13 involving a fixed ai ∈Ai for player
i, which we denote by pi(ai, x): The lowest value that player i must see ã−i being played at x so
that ãi does at least as good as ai. Note that any strictly dominant strategy ãi is 0−dominant, and
any part of a Nash equilibrium is 1−dominant. Therefore, the lower the pi(x), the more dominant
a strategy ãi is for player i at x. Also, its easily seen that each li is a continuous function of both λi
and x.
The global games method relies heavily on the presence of “dominance regions”. These are
defined as subsets of the parameter space on which it is strictly dominant for some or all players to
choose strategies consistent with some profile ã. Unlike FMP (2003), Harrison (2003), and Morris
and Shin (2000, 2009), we require the presense of only one dominance region associated with only
one action profile ã. Furthemore, we directly generalize CvD by requiring that only N− 1 of the
players have a dominant action in the dominance region. The concepts are defined below:
6Risk-dominance is simply p−dominance in the case of a 2×2 game where each pi = 12 .
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Let GX be a parameterized GSS, and ã ∈ A be an action profile. For each player i and strategy
ai 6= ãi, define
Dãi,ai = {x ∈ R |∀a−i,4ui(ãi, ai , a−i, x)> 0}
Then player i’s dominance region is given by Dãi = ∩
ai
Dãi,ai . Also, let us define Dã by a set of x′s
in a parametrized game at which ã is a strict Nash equilibrium and strictly dominant for N−1 of
the players. That is,
Dã = {x ∈ X | ã ∈ NEX(x)∩Dãi f or N−1 o f the i ∈I }
We will assume from here on that Dã is an open interval, which, by our continuity assumptions, is
WLOG.
Finally, we will require that a certain p−dominance condition holds in order to make our
equilibrium selection. We distinguish between the 2−player case and the multiple-player case by
defining P(N) as follows:
• For N = 2,
P(N) =
{
x ∈ X |∀i, j ∈ I, pi(x)+ p j(x)< 1
}
• For N > 2,
P(N) =
{
x ∈ X |∀i ∈ I, pi(x)<
1
N
}
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We now state the first of two main theorems:
Theorem 6. Let G∗(v) = (GX , f ∗, {ϕi}i∈I) be a simple global game, where GX is an ã-based
parameterized game of strategic substitutes for some ã ∈ A. If
1. ã is p−dominant on P(N)
2. I = (a, b)⊆ P(N) is an open interval such that
(a) I∩Dã 6= /0.
(b) ∃αI > 0 such that [a−αI, b+αI]⊆ int(P(N))
3. P(N)⊆ X
Then for each x ∈ I, there exists a ṽ > 0 such that for all v ∈ (0, ṽ], sv(x) = s̄v(x) = ã.
That is, for v small, because action spaces are linearly ordered, any serially undominated strategy
in G∗(v) selects ã at any x satisfying the conditions of Theorem 6. Note that the requirements of
P(N) become more and more demanding as the number of players gets larger. The next section of
this chapter considers a method for resolving this issue.
Below we establish some useful facts which will allow for a sketch of the proof of Theorem
6 before proving it in more generality (Theorem 7). The following Lemma highlights the role of
strategic substitutes in the model. In particular, they allow us to characterize the iterated deletion
of strictly dominated strategies.
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Lemma 4. For each player i ∈I , define
sv,ni =

ai , i f x ∈Pv,ni,ai
ai , otherwise
and sv,ni =

ai , i f x ∈Pv,ni,ai
ai , otherwise
and similarly svi and s
v
i by replacing the P
v,n
i,ai with P
v
i,ai . Then,
1. ∀n, sv,ni ≤ svi ≤ svi ≤ s
v,n
i .
2. sv,ni → svi and s
v,n
i → svi pointwise as n→ ∞.
3. For a given ãi ∈ Ai, then x ∈Pvi, ãi if and only if
7
(a) ∀ai ∈ ã+i ,4πx−i(ãi, ai, sv−i, x)> 0 and
(b) ∀ai ∈ ã−i ,4πx−i(ãi, ai, sv−i, x)> 0
4. Moreover, if x ∈ Dã and v > 0 are such that ∀x ∈ B(x, 2v), B(x, 2v) ⊆ Dã. Then i ∈ I ,
∀v ∈ (0, v],
B(x, 2v)⊆Pvi, ãi
Proof. For the first claim, suppose that for some ai, x ∈Pv,ni,ai . Then x ∈ ∪n≥0P
v,n
i,ai = P
v
i,ai , so that
sv,ni (x) = s
v
i (x). Therefore if s
v,n
i (x)> s
v
i (x), we must have that x∈ (∪ai
Pv,ni,ai)
C. But then sv,ni (x) = ai,
a contradiction. The same argument applies to show svi ≤ s
v,n
i , and obviously s
v
i ≤ svi .
Secondly, let x be given. If for some ai, x ∈Pvi,ai , then since P
v
i,ai = ∪n≥0P
v,n
i,ai , and the P
v,n
i,ai
7By interchanging sv−i and s
v
−i in conditions (a) and (b), we get the corresponding result for GSC. This is essentially
the only point of difference between the two cases.
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are an increasing sequence of sets, ∃N, ∀n≥N, x∈Pv,ni,ai , so that s
v,n
i (x)→ svi (x). If x∈ (∪ai
Pvi,ai)
C,
then since for all n, ∪
ai
Pv,ni,ai ⊆ ∪ai
Pvi,ai , we must have that x ∈ (∪ai
Pvi,ai)
C, giving convergence. The
same arguments can be made to show that sv,ni → svi .
For the third claim, suppose x ∈Pvi, ãi . Since P
v
i, ãi = ∪n≥0P
v,n
i, ãi , ∃N > 0 such that x ∈P
v,N
i, ãi .
We now show that for all n, svi and s
v
i are in S
v,n
i . Suppose this is not the case. Then ∃n, ∃ai,
∃x′ ∈ Pv,ni,ai such that s
v
j(x
′) 6= ai or svj(x′) 6= ai. Since ∀n, P
v,n
i,ai ⊆ P
v
i,ai , then x
′ ∈ Pvi,ai but
svi (x
′) 6= ai or svi (x′) 6= ai , a contradiction. Thus, since this holds for all n, svi and svi are in S
v,N−1
i ,
and since x ∈Pv,Ni, ãi , ai ∈ ã
+
i ⇒4πx−i(ãi, ai, sv−i, x)> 0 and ∀ai ∈ ã
−
i ⇒4πx−i(ãi, ai, sv−i, x)> 0.
Conversely, suppose that ∀ai ∈ ã+i ,4πx−i(ãi, ai, sv−i, x)> 0 and ∀ai ∈ ã
−
i ,4πx−i(ãi, ai, sv−i, x)>
0. Suppose by way of contradiction that x /∈Pvi, ãi . Then ∀n ≥ 1, there exists a s−i ∈ S
v,n−1
−i
such that 4πx−i(ãi, ai, s−i, x) ≤ 0 for either some ai ∈ ã+i or ai ∈ ã
−
i . Let (s
n
−i)
∞
n=1 be any arbi-
trary collection of such s−i at each n, and notice that for each n, s
v,n
−i ≥ sn−i ≥ s
v,n
−i . Suppose that
ai ∈ ã+i . By GSS, we must have that ∀n,4πx−i(ãi, ai, sn−i, x)≥4πx−i(ãi, ai, s
v,n
−i , x). By hypothe-
sis,4πx−i(ãi, ai, sv−i, x)> 0, and hence by continuity and the fact that s
v,n
i → svi , we must have that
for n large, 4πx−i(ãi, ai, s
v,n
−i , x) > 0. Therefore, for n large, we must have 4πx−i(ãi, ai, sn−i, x) ≥
4πx−i(ãi, ai, s
v,n
−i , x)> 0, or4πx−i(ãi, ai, sn−i, x)> 0. Because the same argument can be made for
any ai ∈ ã−i using the fact that 4πx−i(ãi, ai, sn−i, x) ≥4πx−i(ãi, ai, s
v,n
−i , x) > 0, we contradict the
construction of (sn−i)
∞
n=1, and hence x ∈Pvi, ãi .
For part 4, let v∈ (0, v] and i be the player not among the N−1 associated with Dã. Suppose x∈
B(x, 2v). By hypothesis, we have that B(x, 2v)⊆ Dã. Therefore, ∀ j 6= i, ∀n≥ 1, B(x, 2v)⊆ Dã j ⊆
Pv,nj, ã j , so that B(x, 2v) ⊆P
v
j, ã j . For player i, suppose x ∈ B(x, 2v), n ≥ 2, and let s−i ∈S
v,n−1
−i
be arbitrary. Since for each ∀ j 6= i we must have B(x, 2v) ⊆Pv,n−1i, ã j , then each s j |B(x,2v)= ã j.
Therefore, since ã is a strict Nash equilibrium at each such x, we have that ∀ai ∈ Ai,
4πx−i(ãi, ai, s−i, x) =4ui(ãi, ai, ã−i, x)> 0
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That is, B(x, 2v)⊆Pv,ni, ãi ⊆P
v
i, ãi .
The next result can be helpful even beyond the scope of the results presented here. It not only
provides us with a method for calculating the individual pi for which an equilibrium is p-dominant,
but also shows that in our setting, the pi satisfy a useful continuity property when viewed as a
function of x. We first calculate such a value of pi with a fixed ai. When a parameter space X is
mentioned, assume an arbitrary global games embedding.
Proposition 4. Let ã be a strict Nash equilibrium on X. For each player i∈ I, and ai ∈ Ai, we have
that
1. pi(ai, x) =

max
λi∈4(A−i)
li(ai,λi,x)=0
(λi(ã−i)), x /∈ Dãi,ai
0, x ∈ Dãi,ai
2. ∀x ∈ X, pi(x) = max
ai
(pi(ai, x))
3. pi is an upper semi-continuous function on X.
Proof. Appendix.
In the 2−player case, we will use a particular “trick” with players’ beliefs that was developed
by CvD, which is given in Lemma 5. To this end, we will need to be able to ensure that if both
players receive a signal close enough to each other, so that the complete information games that
they respectively observe are approximately equal in terms of payoffs, then the p−dominance
condition continues to hold. The following Corollary tells us that this will be true:
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Corollary 3. Suppose the conditions of Theorem 6 hold in the case of N = 2. If [a, b]⊆ int (P(2)),
then ∃v̄ > 0, ∀v ∈ (0, v̄], ∀x, y ∈ [a, b],
d(x, y)< v =⇒ pi(x)+ p j(y)< 1
Proof. Let v∗ be such that ∀x ∈ [a, b], B(x, v∗)⊆ P. For a contradiction, suppose that ∀v ∈ (0, v∗],
∃v′ ≤ v, ∃xv′, yv′ ∈ [a, b] such that d(xv′, yv′) < v′ and pi(xv′)+ p j(yv′) ≥ 1. Collecting all such
(xv′, yv′)v>0, then since for all v′, xv′ ∈ [a, b], by passing to a subsequence if necessary, we may
assume that xv′ → x∗ ∈ [a, b]. Since ∀v′, d(xv′, yv′) < v′, then then yv′ → x∗. By Proposition 1,
since pi and p j are upper semi-continuous,
pi(x∗)+ p j(x∗)≥ limsup
v′→0
(pi(xv′)+ p j(yv′))≥ 1
contradicting the fact that x∗ ∈ P(2). Therefore, there exists a v̄ > 0 satisfying the hypothesis.
Finally, we must establish how conditional beliefs are formed. Again, this is broken up into the
2−player and multiple-player cases. For any signal xi ∈ X , denote by~x−i the (N−1)×1 vector of
oppenents signals, each equal to xi.
Lemma 5. Suppose the conditions of Theorem 6 hold. Then for each i∈I and xi, x j ∈ I, we have:
• For N = 2,
F∗i
(
x j|xi, v
)
+F∗i
(
xi|x j, v
)
= 1
• For N ≥ 2,
F∗i (~x−i|xi, v)≥
1
N
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Proof. Appendix.
Below is a heuristic sketch of the proof of Theorem 6, the full proof in more generality being
relegated to the next section.
Proof. (Sketch of Theorem 6) Suppose the conditions of Theorem 6 hold. Let (−∞, x) be a region
on which ã is strictly dominant for each player, and [x, ∞) ⊆ P(N). For a contradiction, suppose
that there is some x̃ ∈ I such that for all v > 0, there is some serially undominated strategy s such
that s(x̃) 6= ã, and for each player i consider the points xvi = sup(x | [x, x) ⊆Pvi, ãi). Recalling that
since Pvi, ãi contains those x
′s at which every serially undominated strategy si plays ãi for player i,
s(x̃) 6= ã implies that for some i, xvi < ∞. We now consider both the 2−player and the multiple-
player cases:
• 2 Players: Because xvi < ∞, it must be the case that at xvi , player i does not observe ã j being
played with high enough probability ( > pi (xvi )) to unambiguously best respond with ãi. This
implies that player j must also discontinue playing ã j somewhere near xvi , or x
v
j ∈ B(xvi , 2v),
so that player j also does not observe ãi being played with high enough probability ( >
p j
(
xvj
)
) to unambiguously best respond with ã j. If we suppose that xvi is the lowest of the
two points, so that xvj = x
v
i +d, we get the following graphical representation:
Because v could have been taken to be small enough to satisfy Corollary 3, we have that
pi (xvi )+ p j
(
xvj
)
< 1. However, because player 1 sees ã j being played (approximately) with at
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least probability
(1
2 +
d
2v
)
and player 2 sees ã j being played (approximately) with at least proba-
bility
(1
2 −
d
2v
)
, by the above argument we must have that
pl(xvl )+ p j(x
v
j)≥
(
1
2
+
d
2v
)
+
(
1
2
− d
2v
)
= 1
• N > 2 Players: Following along the same argument as in the 2−player case, let xvi be the
lowest of all such points among all players. Since at xvi player i does not observe ã−i being
played with high enough probability to unambiguously best respond with ãi, and since xvi
being the the lowest of all xvj implies that player i observes ã−i being played with at least
probability F∗i
(
~xv−i|xvi , v
)
, then we musts have that pi(xvi ) ≥ F∗i
(
~xv−i|xvi , v
)
. However, by
Lemma 9, F∗i
(
~xv−i|xvi , v
)
≥ 1N , contradicting the fact that since x
v
i ∈ P(N), pi(xvi )<
1
N .
We now consider some examples:
Example 5. Consider again the modified version of the technology adoption model considered in
Keser, Suleymanova, and Wey (2012) from the introduction. Again allowing vB = x to represent
the parameter of uncertainty, and using the same values for vA, γA, and γB as before, the payoff
matrix is given by the following:
A P3 B
P2 P2
A B A B
P1
A 3, 3, 3 2, x, 2
P1
A 2, 2, x 1, x+3, x+3
B x, 2, 2 x+3, x+3, 1 B x+3, 1, x+3 x+6, x+6, x+6
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For x ∈ [1, 3] , (A, A, A) and (B, B, B) are strict Nash equilibria, and for x > 3, B is the strictly
dominant action for each player. Recall that because we have the parameter restriction x = vB >
vA = 1, no lower dominance region can be established as in the FMP framework, and the same is
true about the upper dominance region if CK about vA is relaxed. Hence the FMP framework does
not apply to any “natural” parameters present in the model.
Applying Theorem 6, we have that for each i = 1, 2, 3,
pi(x) =

3−x
8 1 < x < 3
0 x≥ 3
In order to satisfy pi(x) < 13 for all i ∈ I, we have that (B, B, B) is the global games prediction
for any x > 13 . Because 1 was the lower bound for x in this model, indeterminacy is completely
resolved.
Example 6. Consider a scenario of deterrence between two countries (Player 1 and Player 2),
often modeled by a game of Chicken. In this game, both countries must decide between an ag-
gressive strategy (A) or capitulation (C). We follow the formulation of Baliga and Sjostrom (2009)
by allowing hi to be Player i’s preference for aggression, c and d the respective costs of being ag-
gressive or capitulating in the face of an aggressive opponent, and normalize the payoffs of mutual
capitulation to 0. By assuming that 0 < hi < c− d for each player, we have a game of Chicken
(GSS) with two strict Nash equilibrium (A,C) and (C, A), represented below:
P2
A C
P1
A h1− c, h2− c h1,−d
C −d, h2 0, 0
Examples of such situations where capitulating to an attacking opponent is preferred to mutual
aggression are numerous, including the Cuban missile crisis, the Munich crisis of 1938, and the
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Berlin crisis of 1948. In each of these examples, only one of the two equilibria emerges, with one
party capitulating to the other. Goldmann (1994) suggests that the prevailing party will be the one
that is able to express a stronger preference for aggression. Along these lines, Kilgour and Zagare
(1991) formulate a model in which each player is uncertain about the opponent’s preferences and
conclude that a player will capitulate if they perceive a high enough probability of aggression from
the other party, which they deem a “credible threat”.
Suppose that we allow Player 1 to “send a signal” of their preference for aggression by allowing
h1 = x. Then for 0 < x ≤ c− d we have multiple equilibria as before, but for x > c− d we have
that A is strictly preferred for Player 1. Calculating p1(x) and p2(x) gives p2(x) = h2c−d and
p1(x) =

c−d−x
c−d 0 < x < c−d
0 x≥ c−d
If we instead define a credible threat to be any value of x that is ex-ante plausible in some
situation (within the support of the prior), then as long as Player 1 can make credible threats that
are sufficiently high (x > c− d), we can apply Theorem 6 to the profile (A,C). We find that the
condition
p1(x)+ p2(x)< 1
is satisfied for all x > h2. The interpretation is in line with previous hypotheses: If Player 1 is
able to express a slightly stronger preference for aggression, she will be able to prevail by getting
the opponent to capitulate. In fact, this suggests that the capitulating party need not perceive a
high probability of aggression from the other opponent as in Kilgour and Zagare (1991), all that is
needed is a slight difference in preference for aggression along with a “kernel of doubt” in beliefs.
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2.4 Groups
In this section we relax the classical global games assumption of conditionally independent be-
liefs. That is, after receiving signal xi, we allow for the possibility that player i perceives correlation
among the signals of her opponents. There are at least two main motivations for doing this. First,
in many situations it is more natural to assume that players do in fact receive correlated signals. For
example, consider an n-firm Cournot economy, where two groups of firms are separated geograph-
ically from one another. If common knowledge of a weather forecast-based parameter is relaxed,
it is more plausible to assume that the firms in one region receive the same forecast. Second, there
is strong evidence in the social psychology literature which suggests that decision makers often
exhibit “stereotyping” behavior, which may lead them to infer more correlation about opponents’
types than is actually present.8 As Macrae and Bodenhausen (2000) write, “Given basic cognitive
limitations and a challenging stimulus world, perceivers need some way to simplify and struc-
ture the person perception process. This they achieve through the activation and implementation
of categorical thinking (Allport 1954, Bodenhausen & Macrae 1998, Brewer 1988, Bruner 1957,
Fiske & Neuberg 1990).” They go on to write that, “The principal function of activated categorical
representations is to provide the perceiver with expectancies that can guide the processing of sub-
sequently encountered information (Olson et al 1996). As previously noted, there are two primary
ways that expectancies can influence subsequent information processing. First, they can serve as
frameworks for the assimilation and integration of expectancy-consistent information, leading the
perceiver to emphasize stereotype-consistent information to a greater extent than he or she would
have in the absence of category activation. (e.g. Fiske 1998, Fyock & Stangor 1994, Macrae et
al 1994b,c).”. That is, categorical thinking by a player i may lead to a partitioning of the space
I /{i}, in which each “group” of opponents is ascribed the same informational attribute, or signal
in this context.
8See Healy (2007) for a comprehensive literature review.
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The next definition formalizes this thinking:
Definition 14. Let ã ∈ A. Then G ã = {g1, g2, ..., gN} is an ã−based partitioning of I if ∀i ∈I :
1. gi = gii ∪ gi−i is a partition of I , where gii = {i} and gi−i partitions I /{i}. This can be
expressed as gi =
({
gim
}|gi|
m=1
)
, where gim is the element containing player m and
∣∣gi∣∣ denotes
the total number of elements.
2. It is common knowledge that Player i updates her beliefs by assuming that each player in
each group gij receives xgij = x+vεgij , each εgij being distributed according to uniform density
ϕgij
with support [−1, 1], where
(
f ∗,
{
ϕgij
}
i∈I,gij∈gi
)
are mutually independent.
One extreme case is when each gi is the trivial partitioning consisting of singletons, which
reduces to the traditional global games assumption and the formulation in Theorem 6. The other
extreme case is when a gi consists of only two elements, placing all other opponents into the same
group. This may be a more natural assumption in the presence of a large number of players, or
in more mentally demanding situations, as there is evidence that judgment becomes more stereo-
typical under cognitive load (Macrae and Bodenhausen (2000)). Absent in the above definition is
the notion of “self-stereotyping”, that is, players never include themselves in any other opponent’s
partition element. Allowing for self-stereotyping can be achieved under additional assumptions
and a slightly more complicated proof, which can be found in the online Appendix. Finally, for
any player i and signal xi, we will abuse notation by allowing x−i by the signals received by the
groups in i’s partitioning.9
9For example, if I = {1, 2, 3, 4} and g1 = {{1} , {2} , {3, 4}}, then x−1 =
(
xg12 , xg13
)
, where g12 = {2} and g13 =
{3, 4} . In this way, a function s−1(x−1) is evaluated as
(
s2(xg12), s3(xg13), s4(xg13)
)
.
49
By defining Ng = max
i∈I
(∣∣gi∣∣), we again distinguish the p−dominance condition that must be
satisfied between the 2−player case and the multiple-player case by defining P(Ng) as follows:
• For Ng = 2,
P(Ng) =
{
x ∈ X |∀i, j ∈ I, pi(x)+ p j(x)< 1
}
• For Ng > 2,
P(Ng) =
{
x ∈ X |∀i ∈ I, pi(x)<
1
Ng
}
The second main Theorem is stated below:
Theorem 7. Let G∗(v) =
(
GX , f ∗,
{
ϕgij
}
i∈I,gij∈gi
)
be a simple global game, where GX is an ã-
based parameterized game of strategic substitutes for some ã ∈ A, and G ã = {g1, g2, ..., gN} is
anã−based partitioning of I . If
1. ã is p−dominant on P(Ng)
2. I = (a, b)⊆ P(Ng) is an open interval such that
(a) I∩Dã 6= /0.
(b) ∃αI > 0 such that [a−αI, b+αI]⊆ int(P(Ng))
3. P(Ng)⊆ X.
Then for each x ∈ I, there exists a ṽ > 0 such that for all v ∈ (0, ṽ], sv(x) = s̄v(x) = ã.
In what follows, we will let sv−i(xi) denote the probability with which player i believes that her
opponents will play ã−i according to s−i if xi is observed. Specifically,
sv−i(xi) =
ˆ
R|gi|−1
(1{s−i=ã−i})dµ
∗
Fi(x−i|xi, v)
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Proposition 5. Suppose the conditions of Theorem 7 hold, let i ∈I , and xi ∈ P . Suppose it’s the
case that 0≥4πx−i(ãi, ai, sv−i, xi) for some ai ∈ ã
+
i or 0≥4πx−i(ãi, ai, sv−i, xi) for some ai ∈ ã
−
i .
Then:
1. ∃ j 6= i such that B(xi, 2v)* Pvj, ã j .
2. pi(xi)≥ sv−i(xi) or pi(xi)≥ sv−i(xi), respectively.
Proof. Suppose that 0 ≥4πx−i(ãi, ai, sv−i, xi) for some ai ∈ ã
+
i , the proof of the other case being
identical. For the first part, suppose that ∀ j 6= i, B(xi, 2v)⊆ Pvj, ã j . Then after receiving xi, player i
knows that ã−i is played for sure, and thus we have
0≥4πx−i(ãi, ai, s
v
−i, xi) =
ˆ
R|gi|−1
4ui(ãi, ai, sv−i, xi)dµ∗Fi(x−i|xi, v) =4ui(ãi, ai, ã−i, xi)> 0
a contradiction.
For the second part, we have that
0≥4πx−i(ãi, ai, s
v
−i, xi) =
ˆ
R|gi|−1
4ui(ãi, ai, sv−i, xi)dµ∗Fi(x−i|xi, v)
= ∑
a−i
4ui(ãi, ai, a−i, xi)
 ˆ
R|gi|−1
(1{sv−i=a−i})dµ
∗
Fi(x−i|xi, v)

If we define λ
′
i ∈4(A−i) by λ
′
i (a−i)=
´
R|gi|−1
(1{sv−i=a−i})dµ
∗
Fi(x−i|xi), we have that 0≥ li(ai, λ
′
i , xi).
By the second half of Lemma 10 in the Appendix,10 0≥ li(ai, λ
′
i , xi)⇒ pi(ai, x)≥ λ
′
i (ã−i). There-
100≥4πx−i(ãi, ai, sv−i, xi) implies xi /∈ Dãi,ai and hence Lemma 10 can be applied.
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fore,
pi(x) = max
ai
(pi(ai, xi))≥ pi(ai, xi)≥
λ
′
i (ã−i) =
ˆ
R|gi|−1
(1{sv−i=ã−i})dµ
∗
Fi(x−i|xi, v) = s
v
−i(xi)
completing the proof.
Again if we let~x−i denote the x−i whose elements are given by xi, then we have the following
generalization of Lemma 5:
Lemma 6. Suppose the conditions of Theorem 7 hold. Then for each i ∈ I and xi, x j ∈ I, we have:
• For Ng = 2,
F∗i
(
x j|xi, v
)
+F∗i
(
xi|x j, v
)
= 1
• For Ng ≥ 2,
F∗i
(
~x−i|xgii, v
)
≥ 1|gi|
Proof. Identical to the proof in Lemma 5, but with the ϕv
gij
’s in place of the ϕvi ’s.
Theorem 7 is now proven:
Proof. (Of Theorem 7) Suppose x ∈ I∩Dã. Let v′ < αI2 be such that B(x, 2v
′)⊆ I∩Dã, v′′ satisfy
the conditions of Corollary 3, and v̄ < min(v
′
2 ,
v′′
2 ). For a contradiction, let v ∈ (0, v̄] violate the
hypothesis of Theorem 7, so that for some serially undominated strategy s and some x̃∈ I, s(x̃) 6= ã.
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Since x̃ ∈ I/Dã and Dã is an interval, we can assume WLOG that x̃ lies to the right of Dã.11 For
each player j, define xvj = sup(x | [x, x)⊆Pvj, ã j), noting that since v> v and x satisfy the conditions
of Lemma 4 (4), these are well-defined. From now on, for each player i, let xvgim = minj∈gim
(
xvj
)
.
Now, for each finite xvj, we must have that p j(x
v
j) ≥ sv− j(xvj) or p j(xvj) ≥ sv− j(xvj). To see this,
we show that there is some a j ∈ ã+j such that 0≥4πx− j(ã j, a j, svj, xvj) or a j ∈ ã
−
j such that
0≥4πx− j(ã j, a j, s̄v− j, xvj). If this is not true, then by continuity in x, if4πx− j(ã j, a j, sv− j, xvj)> 0
for all a j ∈ ã+j and4πx− j(ã j, a j, s̄v− j, xvj)> 0 for all a j ∈ ã
−
j , there exists some ε > 0 such that for
each ε ∈ (0, ε], we again have that4πx− j(ã j, a j, sv− j, xvj +ε)> 0 and4πx− j(ã j, a j, s̄v− j, xvj +ε)>
0 for all a j ∈ ã+j and a j ∈ ã
−
j , respectively. By Lemma 4(3), P
v
j, ã j
could then be extended to the
right of xvj, contradicting the definition of x
v
j. Thus, WLOG suppose that there is some a j ∈ ã
−
j
such that 0≥4πx− j(ãi, ai, s̄vj, xvj).
By Proposition 5, we have that pi(xvj)≥ sv− j(xvj).
Let xvl be the smallest of the x
v
j, which must be finite by hypothesis.
12 Since by the above
discussion we may assume 0 ≥4πx−l(ãl, al, s̄v−l, x
v
l ) for some al ∈ ã
−
l , then by Proposition 5(1),
the set
Lvl ≡
{
j 6= l |∃x ∈ B(xvl , 2v)/P
v
j, ã j
}
is non-empty. Let x̂≡ in f
j∈Lvl
(
x ∈ B(xvl , 2v)/P
v
j, ã j
)
, and j∈Lvl be such that x̂= in f
(
x ∈ B(xvl , 2v)/P
v
j, ã j
)
.
Then x̂ satisfies the following properties:
1. x̂ = xvj: Suppose x
v
j > x̂. By the definition of x̂, for every ε > 0 there is some x /∈Pvj, ã j such
that x < x̂+ ε . Setting ε = xvj− x̂ > 0, we have the existence of some x /∈Pvj, ã j such that
x < x̂+(xvj− x̂), or x < xvj, contradicting the definition of xvj. Thus x̂ ≥ xvj. If x̂ > xvj, then
11Or, ∀x ∈ Dã, x̃ > x. In the case of an upper dominance region, simply consider the parameter space X̃ =−X and
ũi = ui(·,−x).
12Since the set of serially undominated strategies for player j is contained in S vj , by hypothesis there exists some
s j ∈S vj such that s j(x̃) 6= ã j. This implies that x̃ /∈Pvj, ã j , and hence x
v
j ≤ x̃ < ∞.
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since x̂ ∈ [xvl , x
v
l +2v), we have that x
v
l +2v > x̂ > x
v
j ≥ xvl . By definition of x
v
j there must be
some x′ ∈ [xvj, x̂) such that x′ /∈Pvj, ã j , contradicting the definition of x̂, giving the result.
2. p j(x̂)≥ sv− j(x̂) or p j(x̂)≥ sv− j(x̂) : Since x̂ = xvj, this follows from the discussion above.
3. ∀m 6= l, x̂ ≤ xvm: Suppose for some m we have x̂ > xvm. The contradiction is the same as in
the second half of part 1.
Denote x̂ = xvj, and note that since x
v
l ∈ [x, x̃] and x
v
j ∈ B(xvl , 2v) ⊆ I ⊆ int(P), Corollary 3
may be applied to xvl and x
v
j. Since x
v
j is also finite, assume that p j(x
v
j) ≥ sv− j(xvj) WLOG for the
remainder of the proof. We have that
F∗l
((
xvglm
)
glm∈gl−l
|xvl , v
)
=
ˆ
R|gl|−1
1x−l≤
(
xv
glm
)
glm∈gl−l

dµ∗Fl(x−l|x
v
l , v)≤
ˆ
R|gl|−1
1{sv−l=ã−l}dµ
∗
Fl(x−l|x
v
l , v) = s
v
−l(x
v
l )
and likewise F∗j
((
xv
g jm
)
g jm∈g j− j
|xvj, v
)
≤ sv− j(xvj). We now consider two cases:
Case 1: Ng = 2: By the above, we have that
pl(xvl )+ p j(x
v
j)≥ sv−l(x
v
l )+ s
v
j(x
v
j)≥ F∗l
(
xvj|xvl , v
)
+F∗j
(
xvl |x
v
j, v
)
≥ 1
contradicting the fact that since v satisfies the conditions of Corollary 3, we must have
pl(xvl )+ p j(x
v
j)< 1
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Case 2: Ng > 2 : Again by the above argument, we have that
pl(xvl )≥ s
v
−l(x
v
l )≥ F
∗
l
((
xvglm
)
glm∈gl−l
|xvl , v
)
(?)
≥ F∗l
(
~xv−l|x
v
l , v
)
≥ 1∣∣gl∣∣
where inequality (?) follows from the fact that xvl is the lowest of all x
v
j. But this contradicts the
fact that we must have pl(xvl )<
1
Ng
≤ 1|gl| , completing the proof.
Note that Theorem 6 follows immediately, which has the same set-up as Theorem 7 but with
the “trivial” partitioning consisting of singletons. We now consider an example.
Example 7. Consider the following version of the Brander-Spencer model, where a foreign firm
(Ff ) decides whether to remain in (R) or leave (L) a market consisting of two domestic firms (Fd),
who must decide whether to enter (E) or stay out (S) of the market. The domestic firms receives a
government subsidy s≥ 0 whereas the foreign firm does not. Suppose we have a simplified payoff
matrix given by the following:
R Ff L
Fd Fd
E S E S
Fd
E −3+ s, −3+ s, −3 2+ s, 0, 2
Fd
E 2+ s, 2+ s, 0 3+ s, 0, 0
S 0, 2+ s, 2 0, 0, 3 S 0, 3+ s, 0 0, 0, 0
This is a game of strategic substitutes parametrized by s≥ 0. For s ∈ [0, 3], the Nash equilibria
are given by (E, S, R), (S, E, R), and (E, E, L), and for s> 3, (E, E, L) is a strict Nash equilibrium,
where E is strictly dominant for the two domestic firms. Note that the parameter restriction s≥ 0
prevents us from establishing a lower dominance region, thus traditional global games methods
cannot be applied. In order to apply Theorem 6, we require that
pi(s)<
1
3
, ∀i ∈ I
55
Calculating the pi functions gives
p1(s) = p2 (s) =

3−s
5 0≤ s < 3
0 s≥ 3
p3(s) =
1
2
, ∀s.
Therefore, Theorem 6 is also violated by p3. However, if each player i has stereotypical beliefs
so that each gi−i is a singleton, then Ng = 2. According to Theorem 7, it is easy to check that
pi (s)+ p j (s)< 1 holds for all s > 12 , and therefore multiplicity can be resolved on (
1
2 , 3].
2.5 Common Valuations and Arbitrary Prior
In this section our main results are extended beyond the simple global game G∗(v) to the
original global game G(v) with common valuations and an arbitrary prior. In order to do so, a
useful variable transformation is used to express expected utility over normalized signal differences
z−i rather than the signals of the opponents themselves. For any player i and signal xi, denote by
−→xi the
(∣∣gi∣∣−1)×1 vector whose elements are given by xi, and define gxi : R|gi|−1→ R|gi|−1 by
gxi(x−i) =
(
x−i−−→xi
v
)
Let Zxi = gxi(R|g
i|−1) denote the set of all normalized signal differences about xi. After receiv-
ing signal xi, player i’s beliefs over Zxi×R are given by µ̃i(z−i, x|xi, z) = µFi(g−1xi (z−i), x|xi, v).
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Applying a change of variables, player i’s expected utility after receiving signal xi against
strategy s−i is given by
πx,x−i(ai, s−i, xi) =
ˆ
R|gi|−1
ˆ
R
ui(ai, s−i(x−i), x)dµFi(x−i, x|xi, v) =
ˆ
Zxi
ˆ
R
ui(ai, s−i(−→xi + vz−i), x)dµ̃i(z−i, x|xi, v)
We can make the same transformation in the simple global game G∗(v) by similarly defining
µ̃∗i (z−i|xi, v) ≡ µ∗Fi(g
−1(z−i)|xi, v). The connection between the games G(v) and G∗(v) will be
made through an intermediate global game, G∗∗(v), defined below.
Definition 15. Let G(v) be a global game as in Definition 10, but alternatively with beliefs µ̃i(z−i, x|xi, v)
as defined above for each player i and each signal xi. Define the intermediate game G∗∗(v) as a
private valuations global game with payoffs as in G(v) but with beliefs over Zxi defined as ∀i ∈ I,
∀xi,
µ̃
∗∗
i (z−i|xi, v) = margZxi (µ̃i(z−i, x|xi, v))
The next Lemma makes a connection between the two games G∗(v) and G∗∗(v). That is, as
v→ 0, beliefs in G∗∗(v) approximate those in G∗(v).
Lemma 7. Let G(v) be a global game. Then as v→ 0, the beliefs µ̃∗∗i (·|xi, v) in G∗∗(v) converge
to those beliefs µ̃∗i (·|xi, v) in G∗(v).13
13Convergence is in the following sense: For all ε > 0, and compact interval B = [b0, b1] such that [b0−2v, b1+2v]
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Proof. See Lemma A.2 in FMP.
From here on, we will assume without mention that ∀i, ∀a ∈ A, ui(a, ·) is Lipschitz continuous
with respect to x. Taking the maximum of all Lipschitz constants guarantees some K > 0 such that
∀i, ∀a ∈ A,
d(x, y)< v⇒ |ui(a, x)−ui(a, y)| ≤ Kv
The last aspect in our approximation lies in the following definition.
Definition 16. Let G(v) be a global game, and let ε ≥ 0. Define the following:
1. ∀i ∈ I, ∀xi ∈ R, ∀M ⊆ S−i, the set of ε−undominated responses for Player i given xi is
URxi(M, ε) = {ai ∈ Ai|∀a
′
i ∈ Ai, ∃s−i ∈M,4πx,z−i(ai, a
′
i s−i, xi)≥−ε}
2. ∀i ∈ I, ∀M ⊆ S−i, the set of ε−undominated responses for Player i is
URi(M, ε) = {si ∈ Si|∀xi ∈ R, si(xi) ∈URxi(M, ε)}
3. ∀M ⊆ S, the set of ε−undominated responses is
UR(M, ε) = ∏
i∈I
URi(M−i, ε)
lies in the interior of the support of f , there exists a ṽ > 0 such that for all xi ∈ B, and all v ∈ (0, ṽ],
µ̃
∗∗
i (·|xi, v) ∈
{
µ ∈4(Zxi)| sup
S⊆Zxi
(|µ(S)− µ̃∗i (S |xi, v)|)≤ ε
}
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By defining S0 = S, and ∀n ≥ 0, Sn+1(ε) = UR(Sn, ε), the set of ε−serially undominated strate-
gies is given by SU(G(v), ε) = ∩
n≥0
Sn(ε). It is easy to verify that for all ε ′ ≥ ε , SU(G(v), ε) ⊆
SU(G(v), ε ′). Thus, since ε = 0 corresponds to the set of serially undominated strategies SU(G(v), 0),
which is non-empty, we have that for all ε ≥ 0, SU(G(v), ε) is non-empty as well. We can like-
wise recast these definitions in terms of an intermediate global game G∗∗(v) by replacing the
URi(M, ε)’s with UR∗∗i (M, ε), Sn(ε) ’s with S
∗∗
n (ε), and SU(G(v), ε) with SU(G
∗∗(v), ε). We
then have the following connection between G(v) and G∗∗(v).
Theorem 8. Let G(v) be a global game and G∗∗(v) the corresponding intermediate game. Then
∀ε > 0, ∃v(ε)> 0, ∀v ∈ (0, v(ε)],
SU(G(v), 0)⊆ SU(G∗∗(v), ε)
Proof. Appendix.
Theorem 8 says that SU(G(v), 0) is approximatelly contained in SU(G∗∗(v), 0), which itself
approximates SU(G∗(v), 0) by Lemma 4, as as v→ 0. In this sense, for v small, SU(G(v), 0)
becomes consistent with the global games solutions offered by Theorem 6 and Theorem 7.
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Chapter 3
On the Learning and Stability of Mixed
Strategy Nash Equilibria in Games of
Strategic Substitutes
3.1 Introduction
Many positive results have been established in the literature on games of strategic substitutes (GSS)
in terms of the characterization of solution sets, adaptive learning processes, and comparative
statics properties.1 The analysis of this wide class of games, however, has concentrated mainly on
situations where players are assumed to play pure strategies only, and although it is well known
that such games need not exhibit pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE), the role of mixed strategies
has largely been ignored. It is therefore important to ask under what conditions players may find
it optimal to randomize over their set of actions, and if mixed strategy Nash equilibria (MSNE)
offer good long-run predictions of behavior. By drawing on a connection in GSS between learning
in repeated play and rationalizability, the first part of this question is answered by determining
a bound for the support of any such mixed behavior. As a consequence, a new characterization
1See Dubey, Haimanko, and Zapechelnyuk (2006), and Roy and Sabarwal (2008, 2010, 2012), for example.
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of global stability and a sufficient condition for the fictitious play property in this class of games
is obtained. The second part of this question confirms that MSNE do not generally offer good
predictions by showing that they are unstable under a range of widely-used learning procedures in
a repeated games framework.
The validity of MSNE as an equilibrium prediction has always been a topic of debate in eco-
nomics. The classical argument against them is as follows: If opponents are behaving in such a
way as to make a player indifferent between a subset of her actions, why would randomizing be
preferred to simply choosing a pure strategy best response? One response to this argument has
been by way of Harsayni’s Purification Theorem, which proves that if players privately observe a
sequence of i.i.d. random shocks to their payoffs, then a mixed equilibrium emerges in the result-
ing game of incomplete information which approximates the original mixed equilibrium.2 More
recent studies have asked whether, if randomizing behavior is to be understood in the framework of
players committing to a distribution over their actions when an underlying game is repeated over
time, players can eventually learn to play according to an equilibrium distribution. Work along
these lines has been conducted in a variety of game-theoretic settings. Crawford (1985) shows that
purely mixed strategy Nash equilibria are always unstable under gradient dynamics.3 Fudenberg
and Kreps (1993), Kaniovski and Young (1995), and Benaim and Hirsch (1997) study the conver-
gence to mixed equilibria in 2×2 games and 3×2 games, whereas Ellison and Fudenberg (2000)
study the stability of MSNE in 3×3 games. Hofbauer and Hopkins (2005) investigates such sta-
bility in 2-player, finite-action games under a smooth fictitious play learning process, and Benaim,
Hofbauer, and Hopkins (2009) studies convergence in games whose Nash equilibria are mixed and
unstable under fictitious play-like learning.
This chapter is most closely related to Echenique and Edlin (EE)(2004), which considers the
stability of purely mixed strategy Nash equilibria in games of strategic complements (GSC) when
the set of players is finite and action spaces are a complete lattice. The heart of the analysis lies
in exploiting a complementarity between the order structure inherit in GSC and a quite general as-
2See Govindan, Reny, and Robson (2003) for a shorter and more general proof of this result.
3As opposed to the best-response dynamics studied here. See Jordan (1993) for a discussion.
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sumption on how players update their beliefs, which includes Cournot and fictitious play learning.
Specifically, if a player makes a small mistake in her beliefs about equilibrium behavior by shifting
an arbitrarily small amount of probability towards the largest action in the support of opponents’
MSNE profile, then this upward shift (in FOSD) of beliefs implies that she will best respond by
playing a strategy higher than her equilibrium mixed strategy. A subsequent update in beliefs again
results in even higher shift in beliefs, resulting in an even higher response. This pattern continues
on indefinitely, so that intended play never returns to the original MSNE. A similar argument can
be made when the underlying game is a GSS, as the next example illustrates:
Consider the following slight variation to the 3-player Dove-Hawk-Chicken game presented in
Sabarwal and Roy (2010):
D P3 H
P2 P2
D H D H
P1
D 1, 1, 1 ε , 2, 1
P1
D 1, ε , 2 1, 1, ε
H 2, 1, ε 1, ε , 1 H ε, 1, 1 0, 0, 0
where ε ∈ (0, 12). This is a GSS which has no PSNE. One would hope, therefore, that a MSNE
would provide a good prediction of play. Calculating the best-response functions, we obtain
BR1 =

D σ3(D)<
(
1−εσ2(D)
2−ε
)
[0, 1] σ3(D) =
(
1−εσ2(D)
2−ε
)
H σ3(D)>
(
1−εσ2(D)
2−ε
) , BR2 =

D σ1(D)<
(
1−εσ3(D)
2−ε
)
[0, 1] σ1(D) =
(
1−εσ3(D)
2−ε
)
H σ1(D)>
(
1−εσ3(D)
2−ε
) , BR3 =

D σ2(D)<
(
1−εσ1(D)
2−ε
)
[0, 1] σ2(D) =
(
1−εσ1(D)
2−ε
)
H σ2(D)>
(
1−εσ1(D)
2−ε
)
We see that when player i believes that opponents are playing σ̂−i = ((12 ,
1
2), (
1
2 ,
1
2)), then
σ̂i = (
1
2 ,
1
2) is a best response. That is, σ̂ defined by ∀i, σ̂i = (
1
2 ,
1
2) is a MSNE. Now suppose that
players make a slight error in their judgments about the behavior of others, and that for α > 0 small,
player i believes that all other players j will play σ j = (12−α,
1
2 +α). Then in the first round, each
player i best-responds uniquely by playing D, or σi = (1, 0). If players are Cournot learners, so that
in each successive round they best-respond only to the profile played in the previous round, then
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in the second round, each player i best responds uniquely by playing H, or σi = (0, 1). Continuing
in this manner, we see that play therefore enters a cycle: (D, D, D), (H, H, H), (D, D, D), .....etc.,
and it never again becomes optimal to best respond by mixing evenly among the two actions. One
immediate question arises when we consider the possibility that players are not purely myopic
in their best responses, and ask what happens if they can anticipate this cyclic behavior to their
advantage. Even if we assume that this happens after a number of rounds of play, we see that if
play ever approaches the original MSNE, a small misspecification of beliefs will once again disrupt
convergence.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 and 3 provide the relevant definitions and the
setup of the model, and introduce the assumptions about how players update their beliefs between
periods of play. Section 4 establishes an interval containing the limit of all intended (mixed) play,
giving new results on global convergence and the fictitious play property. In Section 5 it is shown
that under a wide range of learning rules, truly mixed play over this interval can at best result in
unstable equilibria.
3.2 Model and Assumptions
The standard lattice concepts are used throughout this chapter.4 A game of strategic substitutes
will be defined as follows:
Definition 17. A (strict) GSS Γ = (I, (Ai)i∈I, (ui)i∈I) consists of the following elements:
1. I is a finite set of players, I = {1, 2, ..., N}.
2. Each player i has an action set denoted by Ai. Each Ai is assumed to be a complete lattice
with ordering i. Ai is endowed with the order interval topology, which is assumed to be
Hausdorff, and the corresponding Borel sigma-algebra FAi . Also, A = ∏
i∈I
Ai and A−i = ∏
j 6=i
Ai
are given the product topologies and corresponding Borel sigma-algebras. We will abuse
4For an overview, see Topkis (1998).
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notation by letting  denote the ordering for any Ai, A−i, and A in the respective context,
where the ordering for product sets are understood to be product orders.
3. Each player i has a utility function given by ui : A→ R. We assume that
(a) For each a−i ∈ A−i, each ui is continuous, bounded, and supermodular in ai
(b) Each ui satisfies (strict) decreasing differences in (ai, a−i).5
For each player i, we let4(Ai) denote the set of probability measures (mixed strategies) µi over Ai,
where supp(µi) denotes the support of anyµi,6 and 4(A) = ∏
i∈I
4(Ai) denotes the set of all mixed
strategy profiles. Player i’s beliefs over the actions of her opponents is given by a probability
measure µ ∈ 4(A−i). We will also endow each 4(Ai) or 4(A−i) with the weak∗ topology for
probability measures, or, in the case of finite actions, the topology on the probability simplex as a
subset of Euclidean space.
When player i holds belief µ ∈4(A−i) over opposing actions, the expected utility from playing
action ai ∈ Ai is given by
Ui(ai, µ) =
ˆ
A−i
ui(ai, a−i)dµ
Player i’s best response correspondence BRi : 4(A−i) Ai is then given by
BRi(µ) = argmax
ai∈Ai
(Ui(ai, µ))
Using this notation, we have the following definition.
Definition 18. Let Γ = (I, (Ai)i∈I, (ui)i∈I) be a GSS. Then σ ∈4(A) is a properly mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium (PMSNE) if the following hold:
1. ∀i ∈ I, ∀ai ∈ Ai, ai ∈ supp(σi) only if ai ∈ BRi(σ−i).
2. There exist at least two players i, j∈ I such that |supp(σk)|> 1, k = i, j.
5For all a
′
i, ai ∈ Ai such that a
′
i > ai, and all a
′
−i, a−i ∈ A−i such that a
′
−i ≥ (>)a−i, we have that ui(ai, a
′
−i)−
ui(a
′
i, a
′
−i)≥ (>)ui(ai, a−i)−ui(a
′
i, a−i).
6As is standard, supp(µi) = ∩{E |E closed, µi(E) = 1}
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3.2.1 Repeated Games Framework
The model will consist of a fixed GSS Γ, which, starting at a given reference period t0, is repeated
for t = t0, t0 +1, t0 +2, ..., etc. To this end, each player i is endowed with some probability space
(Ωi, Fi, mi). In each period t ≥ t0 +1, a payoff-irrelevant ω t = (ω t1, ω t2, ...,ω tN) ∈∏
∀i
Ωi is drawn,
after which each player i privately observes ω ti and chooses an action a
t
i. This procedure produces
for each t a time−t history profile ht = (at0+1, at0+2..., at). We let Ht denote all possible time-t
history profiles, where Ht0 = /0, and denote H =
∞
∪
t=t0
Ht . Each player i has repeated game beliefs
µi : H →4(A−i) with the interpretation that, for each ht ∈ H, µi(ht) describes player i’s beliefs
about opponents’ actions based on the current history of play. Letting µ(ht0) denote arbitrary initial
beliefs, the at are chosen in the following way:
Definition 19. A repeated games strategy for player i is a function εi : Ωi×H → Ai such that
∀ωi ∈Ωi, ∀t ≥ t0,
εi(ωi, ht) ∈ BRi(µi(ht))
where, for each ht , εi(·, ht)→ Ai is measurable. The interpretation is that, after viewing a history
ht and formed beliefs µi(ht), a time−t +1 signal ω t+1i is realized, and player i chooses some best
response at+1i = εi(ω
t+1
i , h
t) ∈ BRi(µi(ht)). Then, after viewing at+1−i , new period t + 1 beliefs
µi(ht+1) are formed, and so on. Note that each ωi is payoff-irrelevant, so that εi( ·, ht) : Ωi→ Ai
serves only as a randomization device. Thus, for any history ht , we will define
mt+1i = mi
(
ε
−1
i (·, h
t)
)
: FAi → [0, 1]
as time−t +1 intended play, or mixed strategy best response, from which some at+1i in the sup-
port is chosen after ω t+1i is realized. Finally, if ε ≡ (εi)Ni=1 is a collection of repeated games
strategies for each player, and µ ≡ (µi)Ni=1 is a collection of repeated games beliefs, then we call
(ε, µ, µ(ht0)) a system of behavior and beliefs.
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3.2.2 The First-Order Stochastic Dominance Order
Our results will rely on lattice programming techniques applied to the set of mixed strategies.
Suppose that (X ,) is a poset. A subset E ⊆ X is called increasing if ∀x ∈ E, y ∈ X and y  x
implies that y∈E. If4(X) is the set of probability measures on X such that µ ′, µ ∈4(X), then we
say that µ ′ first-order stochastically dominates µ , written µ ′ F µ , if, for every increasing set
E ⊆ X , µ ′(E)≥ µ(E). µ ′ F µ holds if µ ′ F µ and for some E ⊆ X increasing, µ ′(E)> µ(E).
Note that µ ′ F µ is equivalent to saying that for all f : X → R increasing and integrable with
respect to µ ′ and µ , we have ˆ
X
f dµ ′ ≥
ˆ
X
f dµ
It is easy to verify that for any4(X), (4(X),F) forms a poset. Lastly, for two sets A, B⊆ X ,
A is said to dominate B in the strong set order, written A S B, if ∀x ∈ A, ∀y ∈ B, x∨ y ∈ A and
x∧ y ∈ B.
As is shown in Roy and Sabarwal (2012), the process of iterated deletion of strictly dominated
strategies in a GSS leads to the existence of upper and lower serially undominated strategies,
denoted a and a, respectively. We then have the following:
Proposition 6. Let Γ = (I, (Ai)i∈I, (ui)i∈I) be a GSS. Then for each player i ∈ I,
1. ∀µ ∈4(A−i), ∧BRi(µ) ∈ BRi(µ), and ∨BRi(µ) ∈ BRi(µ).
2. If µ ′, µ ∈4(A−i) are such that µ ′ F µ , then
BRi(µ)≥S BRi(µ ′)
3. Let Γ be a strict GSS, and σ̂ = (σ̂i, σ̂−i) a PMSNE. For any ε ∈ (0, 1], define
µ
ε = (1− ε)σ̂−i + ε1{a−i}
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If a−i = a−i, then
∧BRi(µε) ∨BRi(σ̂−i)
Similarly, if a−i = a−i,
∧BRi(σ̂−i) ∨BRi(µε)
Proof. For the first claim, since each ui is continuous, bounded, and supermodular in Ai (a prop-
erty which is preserved under integration), then for each µ ∈ 4(A−i), Ui(, µ) : Ai → R satisfies
supermodularity and upper semi-continuity. Since Ai is a complete lattice, then by Milgrom and
Shannon (1994),
BRi(µi) = argmax
ai∈Ai
(Ui(ai, µ))
is a non-empty, complete lattice.
Because (4(A−i),F) is a poset, Claim 2 will follow from Sabarwal and Roy (2010) by
showing that Ui satisfies decreasing differences in (ai, µi). To that end, let a
′
i > ai and µ
′ F µ .
Then l : A−i→ R defined by
li(a−i) = ui(ai, a−i)−ui(a
′
i, a−i)
is increasing in a−i by decreasing differences. Therefore
Ui(ai, µ)−Ui(a
′
i, µ) =
ˆ
A−i
l(a−i)dµ
≤
ˆ
A−i
l(a−i)dµ
′
=U(ai, µ
′
)−Ui(a
′
i, µ
′
)
giving decreasing differences, where the third inequality follows from first order stochastic
dominance.
The third claim is shown in the Appendix.
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3.3 Belief Formation
In this section we describe how players update their beliefs from one round of play to another.
To establish notation, if µi(ht0) is any initial belief, then µi(ht0, ht) denotes the result of µi(ht0)
being updated according to some subsequent history ht . Likewise, if ht is any history of play,
and xt+1−i any time−t +1 profile of opponents’ actions, µi(ht , x
t+1
−i ) represents µi(h
t) being updated
according to the subsequent play xt+1−i .
Definition 20. Let (ε, µ, µ(ht0)) be a system of behavior and beliefs. Define Mi =∧supp(µi(ht0))
and Mi = ∨supp(µi(ht0)). Then
1. Beliefs are monotone if ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ≥ t0
(a) µi(ht0)≤F µi(ht0)≤F µi(h
t0) and ht  ht  ht implies
µi(ht0, ht)≤F µi(ht0, ht)≤F µi(h
t0, h
t
)
(b) yt0+1−i Mi Mi  z
t0+1
−i implies
µi(ht0, y
t0+1
−i )≤F µi(h
t0)≤F µi(ht0, zt0+1−i )
And for t > t0, yt+1−i 
(
∧ht−i
)
∧Mi 
(
∨ht−i
)
∨Mi  zt+1−i implies
µi(ht , yt+1−i )≤F µi(h
t)≤F µi(ht , zt+1−i )
2. Beliefs are asymptotically empirical if, whenever a sequence of play is convergent, or
at → a, then µi(ht)→ 1{a−i}.
Note that the above conditions are rather weak. 1 (a) requires that observing a higher (lower)
history of actions results in higher (lower) beliefs in FOSD. 1 (b) requires that that at any time t,
if next period play by opponents is higher (lower) than both anything played up to that point, as
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well as the support of initial beliefs, then next period beliefs are higher (lower) in FOSD. These
assumptions allow for a very wide range of updating rules. Consider, for example, the geometri-
cally weighted beliefs of Benaïm, Hofbauer, and Hopkins (2009), which are updated according to,
for each player i,
µi(ht) = (1−λt)µi(ht−1)+λt1{at−i}
where for each round t, λt ∈ [0, 1]. If λt = 1 for all t, then players exhibit “Cournot beliefs”, where
next period play is determined by best responding to the pure strategy play of the previous round.
Alternatively, if we allow each player i’s initial beliefs µi(ht0) to be of the form µi(ht0)(a−i) =
Ka−i
t0
,
where the (Ka−i)a−i∈A−i describe player i’s initial fictitious weight on opponents’ actions, then
setting λt = 1t+1 for each player gives us the fictitious play beliefs introduced by Brown (1951).
That is, each player i’s beliefs are updated according to the historical frequency, given by, for all
t ≥ t0,
µi(ht) =
(
t
t +1
)
µi(ht−1)+
(
1
t +1
)
1{at−i}
Both of these models of learning have shown positive results in experimental settings.7 Lemma
8 below states that geometrically weighted beliefs, which allow for any combination of these two
models, satisfy the requirements of Definition 20.
Lemma 8. Let (ε, µ, µ(ht0)) be a system of behavior and beliefs. If ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ≥ t0, µi(ht) is
updated according to geometrically weighted beliefs and λt ∈ [ 1t+1 , 1], then beliefs are monotone
and asymptotically empirical.
One immediate question arises from the above formulation. Suppose that µi(ht0) are player i’s
initial beliefs representing opponents’ play in a properly mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. How
then is it possible that she may be a Cournot learner when Cournot learning never lends itself to
properly mixed beliefs? Certainly the fact that an individual may be a Cournot learner does not pre-
vent her from holding more complex beliefs about opponents’ actions. The resolution of this issue
7See Boylan and El-Gamal (1993), Cheung and Friedman (1997), Huck, Normann, Oechssler (2002), and Gerber
(2006), for example.
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comes by way of making the distinction between “stated beliefs” and “latent beliefs”. Following
Rutström and Wilcox (2009), stated beliefs are those beliefs that a player would consciously hold
if they were elicited from her by a third party. Latent beliefs refer to the true but unobserved “be-
liefs in the head”, which may be driven by emotional or automatic, subconscious processes, and
are those which are consistent with a player’s behavior.
3.4 Bounds on Learning
We now study the limits of intended play in GSS starting at any initial beliefs µ(ht0). To do this,
we draw on a connection between iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS) and
learning in a repeated GSS. This allows us to establish an interval for the support of any mixed
play in the limit, and give sufficient conditions for when this interval converges to a singleton,
guaranteeing a PSNE. In order to proceed, we introduce a necessary definition.
Definition 21. The best response dynamic starting from ∧A and ∨A are given by the sequences
(yt)∞t=0 and (z
t)∞t=0 defined as
1. y0 = ∧A and z0 = ∨A
2. yt =

∧BR(yt−1), t even
∨BR(yt−1), t odd
, zt =

∨BR(zt−1), t even
∧BR(zt−1), t odd
3. The lower mixture and upper mixtures of (yt)∞t=0 and (z
t)∞t=0 are the sequences (x
t)∞t=0 and
(x̄t)∞t=0 defined as
xt =

yt , t even
zt , t odd
, xt =

zt , t even
yt , t odd
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Proposition 7. Let Γ = (I, (Ai)i∈I, (ui)i∈I) be a GSS, (x̄t)∞t=0 and (x
t)∞t=0 be the upper and lower
mixtures of the best response dynamics. Then the following are true:
1. x̄t → ā, and xt → a, where ā and a are the largest and the smallest serially undominated
strategies of Γ, respectively.
2. If ∧BRi and ∨BRi are continuous, then ai = ∨BRi(a−i) and ai = ∧BRi(a−i).
Proof. See Sabarwal and Roy (2012).
We now come to the first of the main results. It states that under weak assumptions on how
beliefs are updated, the evolution of intended play starting at any initial beliefs will eventually be
contained within the interval determined by the upper and lower serially undominated strategies.
Theorem 9. Let Γ = (I, (Ai)i∈I, (ui)i∈I) be a GSS, and (ε, µ, µ(ht0)) a system of behavior and
beliefs. If, for each i, ∧BRi and ∨BRi are continuous, and beliefs are monotone and asymptotically
empirical, then8
[
limin f
(
supp
(
mt+1i
))
, limsup
(
supp
(
mt+1i
))]
⊆ [ai, ai]
Proof. First, we define the histories ht , ht by the following:
• µ(ht0) = 1{∧A}, µ(h
t0) = 1{∨A}, h
0 = {∧A}, h0 = {∨A}
• ∀t ≥ t0, st+1 = ∧BR(µ(h
t
)), st+1 = ∨BR(µ(ht)), ht+1 =
{
ht , st+1
}
, h
t
=
{
h
t
, st+1
}
Let(ω t)∞t=t0+1 ⊆Ω
∞ be arbitrary. Note that we have that
µ(ht0)≤F µ(ht0)≤F µ(h
t0)
8Recall that if {Zt}∞t=1 is a sequence of sets, then limin f (Zt) = ∨t≥1 ∧m≥t Z
m and limsup(Zt) = ∧
t≥1
∨
m≥t
Zm .
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Proposition 6 gives
st0+1 = ∧BR(µ(ht0)) BR(µ(ht0)) ∨BR(µ(ht0)) = st0+1
or, since at0+1 = ε(ω t0+1, ht0)
st0+1  at0+1  st0+1
We proceed by induction by supposing that for t0 +1≤ l ≤ t,
sl  al  sl
Note that by µ(ht0)≤F µ(ht0)≤F µ(h
t0) and by the induction hypothesis ht  ht  ht , monotonicity
of beliefs gives
µ(ht0, ht)≤F µ(ht0, ht)≤F µ(h
t0, h
t
)
By Proposition 6, since at+1 = ε(ω t+1, ht),
st+1  at+1  st+1
completing the induction step. Because (ω t)∞t=t0+1 ⊆ Ω
∞ was arbitrary, it follows that for each
player i,
supp
(
mt+1i
)
⊆
[
st+1i , s
t+1
i
]
It is now shown that the sequences (st)∞t=t0+1 and (s
t)∞t=t0+1 are monotone increasing and decreas-
ing, respectively. For each player i, define Mli ≡∨supp
(
µi(ht0)
)
=∧A−i and Mui =∧supp
(
µi(h
t0)
)
=
∨A−i. Since for each i, st0+1−i Mui , then by monotone beliefs we have that µi(h
t0, st0+1−i )≤F µi(h
t0).
By Proposition 6,
st0+2 = ∧BR(µ(h0, st0+1)) ∧BR(µ(ht0)) = st0+1
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A similar argument shows that st0+1  st0+2. Suppose that for t0 + 1 ≤ l ≤ t, (sl)tl=t0+1 and
(sl)tl=t0+1 are increasing and decreasing sequences, respectively. Again, since for each i, s
t
−i (
∧ht−1−i
)
∧Mui , monotonicity of beliefs gives µi(h
t−1
, st−i)≤F µi(h
t−1
). Thus
st+1 = ∧BR(µ(ht−1, st)) ∧BR(µ(ht−1)) = st
Similarly, st  st+1, establishing monotonicity. Therefore, we have that st→ s and st→ s for some
s, s ∈ A.
By the continuity of ∧BR and ∨BR, and the fact that beliefs are asymptotically empirical, we
have that
s = lim
t→∞
(
∧BR(µ(ht)
)
= ∧BR
(
lim
t→∞
(
µ(h
t
)
))
= ∧BR(s) ∈ BR(s)
Likewise, s ∈ BR(s). Therefore, s and s are rationalizable strategies, and hence serially undomi-
nated. Because a and a are the smallest and largest serially undominated strategies, respectively,
then for each player i,
ai  si = ∨z>t0
∧
t≥z
st  ∨
z≥t0
∧
t≥z
supp
(
mti
)
Similarly,
ai  ∧
z>t0
∨
t≥z
supp
(
mti
)
giving the result.
Say that a game Γ is globally stable if it contains a (mixed strategy) Nash equilibrium σ̂ such
that intended play converges to it under any system of behavior and beliefs. We then have the
following immediate Corollary.
Corollary 4. Under the conditions of Theorem 9, if Γ is dominance solvable, then Γ is globally
stable.
73
Milgrom and Roberts (1991) show that if beliefs are “adaptive” in the sense that the probability
assigned to actions which are played only a finitely amount of times eventually goes to 0, then any
dominance solvable game will be globally stable. However, the set of beliefs which are asymp-
totically empirical is strictly larger than those which are adaptive. Consider the learning model of
Moreno and Walker (1991)(MW), where players best respond to the entire sample average,9 where
for any history ht ,
µi(ht) =
1
t +1
t+1
∑
j=0
a j−i
It is straightforward to show that these beliefs are asymptotically empirical, but are not adaptive:
If play were to cycle between 0 and 1, for example, then beliefs would always be strictly contained
in (0, 1), although nothing within this set is ever actually played. This argument can be extended
to include beliefs whose distribution is centered around the sample average along with a sample
variance, among others.
9Strategy spaces are assumed to be a convex subset of Rn, and a0−i can be represented by initial beliefs 1{a0−i}.
Healy (2006) generalizes this model by considering truncated histories and a k−periods average.
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Example 8. Consider the Type II duopoly of Cox and Walker (1998)(CW), where the marginal
costs of each firm are sufficiently large so that the best response of firm 2 cuts firm 1’s from
above,10 as shown below
CW test in an experimental setting whether human subjects can learn to play the stable border
equilibria in a repeated game. Intuition for the stability of such equilibria is clear: Small perturba-
tions away from a boundary equilibrium must begin either in region A or D, in which case it is easy
to verify that Cournot dynamics quickly lead back to the respective equilibrium. In order to obtain
such baseline theoretical predictions as to when experimental behavior can be expected to con-
verge under more complex learning rules, CW simulate various models of learning and conclude
that fictitious play and MW learning seem to converge as well.
However, Theorem 9 and Corollary 4 immediately offer a much more general conclusion,
which does not require ex-ante computer simulations: Since BR(A)⊆ A and BR(D)⊆ D, regions
A and D can themselves be viewed as sub-GSS. Ignoring the interior equilibrium, we see that the
boundary equilibria are the dominance solvable solutions in their respective regions, and hence any
beliefs which are monotone and asymptotically empirical, including Cournot, fictitious play, and
MW, can be guaranteed to converge.
10We analyze a simplified version with continuous action spaces and symmetric payoffs.
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3.5 Instability of PMSNE
In this section we study whether mixed behavior is a valid equilibrium prediction when intended
play does not converge to a singleton as in Corollary 4. Section 3.5.1 deals with the case when
players put sufficient weight on the play of the previous round, which, as is supported empirically
by Cheung and Friedman (1997), is likely a reasonable assumption in more informative environ-
ments. This assumption will also always incorporate Cournot learning.
3.5.1 p-Instability
In this subsection we will assume that each Ai is finite and linearly ordered. Recall from Proposition
6 that ā and a are the upper and lower serial undominated strategies, respectively.
Definition 22. For each player i, and ai ∈ Ai, let paii (ai) ∈ [0, 1] be the smallest value such that for
any λ ∈4(A−i) satisfying λ (a−i)≥ p
ai
i (ai),
∑
a−i
ui(ai, a−i)λ (a−i)≥∑
a−i
ui(ai, a−i)λ (a−i)
or
lai(ai, λ )≡∑
a−i
4ui(ai, ai, a−i)λ (a−i)≥ 0
We define paii (ai) similarly as the smallest probability that player i must see a−i being played
in order that ai does better than a given ai. We then have the following characterization of p
ai
i (ai)
and paii (ai):
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Proposition 8. Let Γ = (I, (Ai)i∈I, (ui)i∈I) be a strict GSS. Suppose there exists a PMSNE σ̂ such
that for each player i ∈ I, ai, ai ∈ BRi (σ̂−i). Then, for each player i, and ai 6= ai, ai, we have that
1. paii (ai) =

0, ai strictlydominatesai
max
λ∈4(A−i)
lai (ai,λ )=0
(
λ (a−i)
)
, otherwise
2. paii (ai) =

0, ai strictlydominatesai
max
λ∈4(A−i)
lai (ai,λ )=0
(λ (a−i)) , otherwise
3. pai ≡ max
ai
(
pai(ai)
)
, pai ≡ max
ai
(pai(ai)) ∈ [0, 1)
4. For all λ ∈4(A−i),
µ(a−i)> p
ai
i
(
resp.µ(a−i)> p
ai
i
)
⇒
BRi (µ) = ai (resp. = ai)
Proof. Appendix.
Proposition 8 generalizes the extent to which a∈ BR(a) and a∈ BR(a): If, for player i, paii = 1,
then ai is simply a best response to a−i. If p
ai
i = 0, then ai is a strictly dominant action, and
if paii ∈ (0, 1), then ai is a best response to any λ so long as λ (a−i) ≥ p
ai
i and strictly so if the
inequality is strict.
The next definition formalizes a lower bound for the weight associated to previous action
played for beliefs in a repeated game.
Definition 23. Let (ε, µ, µ (ht0)) be a system of behavior and beliefs, and p = (pi)i∈I ∈ [0, 1]N .
Then (ε, µ, µ (ht0)) is p−consistent if ∀i ∈ I, ∀t ≥ t0 +1, µi (ht)(at−i)≥ pi.
It is easy to check that geometric beliefs satisfy p−consistency as long as λt ≥ pi for each
player i ∈ I and t ≥ t0+1. In fact, Cournot beliefs are always p−consistent for any p. This notion,
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together with Proposition 8, will be the driving force behind the instability of MSNE, which is
defined below. For any µ̂ ∈ 4(A) ≡ ∏
i∈I
4(Ai), we will denote by µ̂−i the product measure of the
µ̂ j, j 6= i.
Definition 24. Let Γ = (I, (Ai)i∈I, (ui)i∈I) be a GSS, and µ̂ ∈4(A). Then µ̂ is p−unstable if, for
each player i, and each open neighborhood Vi of µ̂−i, there exists a µ
′ ∈Vi such that for any system
of p-consistent behavior and beliefs (ε, µ, µ (ht0)) such that µi (ht0) = µ
′
, we have that intended
play remains outside of some neighborhood W of µ̂ . That is, for each t ≥ t0,
(
mt+1i
)
i∈I /∈W .
We are now ready to state the first instability result.
Theorem 10. Let Γ = (I, (Ai)i∈I, (ui)i∈I) be a strict GSS, and σ̂ ∈ 4(A) be a PMSNE. If ∀i ∈ I,
ai, ai ∈ BRi (σ̂−i), then there exists a p ∈ [0, 1)N such that σ̂ is p−unstable.
Proof. Let i ∈ I, and Vi be an open set containing σ̂−i. Since
∥∥((1− ε)σ̂−i + ε1{a−i})− σ̂−i∥∥→ 0
as ε → 0, then we can follow the requirements of instability by choosing an εi ∈ (0, 1) such that
µi
(
ht0
)
≡ (1− εi)σ̂−i + εi1{a−i} ∈Vi
We will now choose the set W according to instability in the following way: For each player i, let
Wi be any open set containing σ̂i if σ̂i is degenerate. If σ̂i is purely mixed, let di be such that
0 < di < min
(∥∥σ̂i−1{ai}∥∥
2
,
∥∥σ̂i−1{ai}∥∥
2
)
By letting Wi be the open ball B(σ̂i, di), we have that W = ∏
i∈I
Wi is open set containing σ̂ .
Finally, by Proposition 3, both pai and paii lie in [0, 1). Let pi ∈ (pai, 1]∩ (p
ai
i , 1] for each player i,
and define p = (pi)i∈I . We now show that intended play starting at µ (h
t0) and updated according
to p−consistency remains outside of the open set W containing σ̂ .
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It is an easy fact to check that
σ̂−i <F µi(ht0)≤F 1{a−i}
for each player i. Thus,
ai
(1)
= ∧BRi(1{a−i})
(2)
 ∧BRi
(
µi(ht0)
)
 ∨BRi
(
µi(ht0)
) (3)
 ∧BRi(σ̂−i)
(4)
= ai
where (1) follows from Proposition 7 (2), (2) and(3) from Proposition 6, and (4) from the fact that
so that ai ∈ BRi(σ̂−i). Therefore, for each player i,
(
mt0+1i = 1{ai}
)
i∈I
/∈W
To proceed by induction, suppose that for some t ≥ t0+1, mt+1i = 1{ai} for each i, so that a
t+1 = a.
By p−consistent beliefs, since µi(ht+1)
(
a−i
)
≥ pi > paii , we have by Proposition 8 that ai is a
strict best response, so that (
mt+2i = 1{ai}
)
i∈I /∈W
Because a similar argument holds for any t ≥ t0 +1 such that mt+1i = 1{ai} for each i, we have the
result.
Recall that if σ̂ = (σ̂i)i∈I is any MSNE, then for each i, it must be that supp(σ̂i) ⊆ [ai, ai].
The condition ai, ai ∈ BRi (σ̂−i) for each player i simply requires that the extremal strategies that
define these bounds are themselves best responses to opponents’ equilibrium strategy, and does not
require them to lie in the support of σ̂i itself. Notice that this is always satisfied for binary-action
games with equilibria in which each player purely mixes over both actions.
Example. Again consider the Dove-Hawk-Chicken example in the introduction. It is easily ver-
ified that this is a strict GSS for ε ∈ (0, 12), and that σ̂ defined by ∀i, σ̂i = (
1
2 ,
1
2) is a MSNE
satisfying the conditions of Theorem 10. Also, since for each player i, paii = p
ai
i =
1
2 , then re-
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gardless of how players update their beliefs, as long as any probability larger than 12 is ascribed to
the previous round’s play, intended play will never return to σ̂ after a perturbation. That is, σ̂ if
p ∈ [0, 1)N is any vector such that pi > 12 for each i, then σ̂ is p−unstable.
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Appendix A
Additional Proofs, Chapter 2
The proof of Proposition 4 is given below. In order to do so, we first establish Lemmas 9−12:
Lemma 9. Suppose ã is a strict, p−dominant Nash equilibrium and for some player i ∈ I , and
ai ∈ Ai, x /∈ Dãi,ai . Then ∃λi ∈4(A−i) such that li(ai, λi, x) = 0.
Proof. Since ã is a strict Nash equilibrium, we have that li(ai, 1ã−i, x) > 0. Suppose for all λi ∈
4(A−i), li(ai, λi, x) > 0. Then for all a−i, 4ui(ãi, ai, a−i, x) > 0, contradicting the fact that x /∈
Dãi,ai . Thus for some λ̄i, li(ai, λ̄i, x)≤ 0 . Consider the set of probability measures
Z =
λ αi =

α +(1−α)λ̄i(ã−i) i f a−i = ã−i
(1−α)λ̄i(a−i) i f a−i 6= ã−i
| α ∈ [0, 1]

Note that λ 1i = 1ã−i and λ
0
i = λ̄i, giving us li(ai, λ
1
i , x)> 0 and li(ai, λ
0
i , x)≤ 0. Since li(ai, λ αi , x)
is a continuous function of α , by the intermediate value theorem ∃ᾱ ∈ [0, 1) such that li(ai, λ ᾱi , x)=
0, giving the result. 2
Lemma 11 will show that the set {λi ∈ 4(A−i) | li(ai, λi, x) = 0} is compact, and since it is
non-empty by Lemma 9, the value
p̂i(ai, x)≡ max
λi∈4(A−i)
li(ai,λi,x)=0
(λi(ã−i))
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is well-defined. We now show that for all such x ∈ X , pi(ai, x) = p̂i(ai, x).
Lemma 10. Suppose that x /∈ Dãi,ai . Then pi(ai, x) = p̂i(ai, x).
Proof. It is first shown that pi(ai, x)≤ p̂i(ai, x). In order to do so, we show that for all λ
′
i ∈4(A−i)
such that λ
′
i (ã−i) ≥ p̂i(ai, x), li(ai, λ
′
i , x) ≥ 0. Because pi(ai, x) is defined as the lowest value
that satisfies this property, the conclusion follows. Suppose λ
′
i ∈ 4(A−i) is such that λ
′
i (ã−i) ≥
p̂i(ai, x), but li(ai, λ
′
i , x)< 0. Since ã is a strict Nash equilibrium, we have that li(ai, 1ã−i, x)> 0.
Consider the set of probability measures
Z =
λ αi =

α +(1−α)λ ′i (ã−i) i f a−i = ã−i
(1−α)λ ′i (a−i) i f a−i 6= ã−i
| α ∈ [0, 1]

Note that λ 1i = 1ã−i and λ
0
i = λ
′
i , giving us li(ai, λ
1
i , x)> 0 and li(ai, λ
0
i , x)< 0. Since li(ai, λ
α
i , x)
is a continuous function of α , by the intermediate value theorem ∃ᾱ ∈ (0, 1) such that li(ai, λ ᾱi , x)=
0. Since λ ᾱi (ã−i) = ᾱ +(1− ᾱ)λ
′
i (ã−i)> λ
′
i (ã−i), we have found a λ
ᾱ
i such that li(ai, λ
ᾱ
i , x) = 0
but λ ᾱi (ã−i) > λ
′
i (ã−i) ≥ p̂i(ai, x), contradicting the definition of p̂i(ai, x). Hence pi(ai, x) ≤
p̂i(ai, x).
To show equality, suppose that pi(ai, x) < p̂i(ai, x). We will show that for any λ
′′
i ∈ 4(A−i)
such that λ
′′
i (ã−i)> pi(ai, x), we must have li(ai, λ
′′
i , x)> 0. Hence if pi(ai, x)< p̂i(ai, x) is true,
any λ
′′
i such that λ
′′
i (ã−i) = p̂i(ai, x) must be such that li(ai, a−i, λ
′′
i , x)> 0, a contradiction to the
existence of p̂i(ai, x). Let A = argmin
a−i
(4ui(ãi, ai, a−i, x)). Note that ã−i is not part of this set,
or else x /∈ Dãi,ai would be contradicted. Let λi be such that λi(ã−i) = pi(ai, x), and assign to all
a−i in A the probability
1−λi(ã−i)
|A | . By the definition of ãi being pi(ai, x) dominant, we must have
that li(ai, λi, x) ≥ 0. Now let λ
′
i be such that λ
′
i (ã−i) > pi(ai, x), and assign to all a−i in A the
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probability 1−λ
′
i (ã−i)
|A | . It follows that
1
li(ai, λ
′
i , x) =4ui(ãi, ai, ã−i, x)λ
′
i (ã−i)+
(
1−λ ′i (ã−i)
|A |
)
∑
A
4ui(ãi, ai, a−i x)>
4ui(ãi, ai, ã−i, x)λi(ã−i)+
(
1−λi(ã−i)
|A |
)
∑
A
4ui(ãi, ai, a−i x) = li(ai, λi, x)≥ 0
Finally, let λ
′′
i be arbitrary but satisfying λ
′′
i (ãi) = λ
′
i (ã−i). By the construction of λ
′
i , li(ai, λ
′
i , x)
gives the smallest value for such probability measures, and therefore li(ai, a−i, λ
′′
i , x)≥ li(ai, a−i, λ
′
i , x)>
li(ai, a−i, λi, x)≥ 0, or li(ai, λ
′′
i , x)> 0, giving the result. 2
The upper semi-continuity of pi(ai, x) is now established in two steps.
Lemma 11. pi(ai, x) is an upper semi-continuous function on X ∩ (Dãi,ai)C.
Proof. Recall the Maximum Theorem:2 If pi(ai, x) = max
λi∈4(A−i)
li(ai,λi,x)=0
(λi(ã−i)) is such that ϕ : X ∩
(Dãi,ai)C ⇒4(A−i), ϕ(x) = {λi ∈ 4(A−i) | li(ai, λi, x) = 0} is upper hemi-continuous with non-
empty, compact values, and f : g f (ϕ)→R defined as f (x, λi) = λi(ã−i) is upper semi-continuous,
then pi(ai, ·) is upper semi-continuous. We show one-by-one that these conditions are met:
Let (xn, λ ni )
∞
n=1⊆ g f (ϕ) be such that (xn, λ ni )→ (x, λ ). Then limn→∞( f (x
n, λ ni ))= limn→∞
(λ ni (ã−i))=
λi(ã−i) = f (x, λi), showing that f is continuous, and therefore upper semi-continuous.
By Lemma 9, ϕ : X ∩ (Dãi,ai)C ⇒ 4(A−i) is non-empty valued. To see that it is compact
valued, let x be given and suppose (λ ni )
∞
n=1 ⊆ ϕ(x) is such that λ ni → λi. Because 4(A−i) is
closed, λi ∈4(A−i). Because li(·, x) :4(A−i)→R is continuous, li(ai, λi, x) = 0, and hence ϕ(x)
1Note that ∑
A
4ui(ãi, ai, a−i, x)≤ 0: If4ui(ãi, ai, a−i, x)> 0 for each a−i, x /∈Dãi,ai is contradicted. Thus for some
a−i,4ui(ãi, ai, a−i, x)≤ 0, and the conclusion follows by the definition of A .
2Aliprantis, Lemma 17.30
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is closed-valued. Since ϕ(x)⊆4(A−i), it is therefore compact valued.
Finally, we see that ϕ is upper hemi-continuous. Recall that a correspondence with a com-
pact and Hausdorff range space has a closed graph if and only if it is upper hemi-continuous
and closed valued. It therefore suffices to show that ϕ has a closed graph. To that end, sup-
pose (xn, λ ni )
∞
n=1 ⊆ g f (ϕ) is such that (xn, λ ni )→ (x, λi). Because X ∩ (Dãi,ai)C is closed, x ∈ X .
Because 4(A−i) is closed, λi ∈ 4(A−i). Lastly, because li : X ×4(A−i) → R is continuous,
li(ai, λi, x) = lim
n→∞
(li(ai, λ ni , x
n)) = 0, and thus (x, λi) ∈ g f (ϕ), so that g f (ϕ) is closed, complet-
ing the Lemma. 2
Lemma 12. pi(ai, x) is an upper semi-continuous function on all of X.
Proof. Let (xn)∞n=1 ⊆ X be such that xn → x. It’s shown that limsup
n
(pi(ai, xn)) ≤ pi(ai, x) by
considering two cases:
Case 1: Suppose ∃K > 0, ∀n≥ K, xn ∈ Dãi,ai . If x ∈ Dãi,ai , then
limsup
n
(pi(ai, xn)) = in f
k≥1
sup
n≥k
(pi(ai, xn))≤ sup
n≥K
(pi(ai, xn)) = 0≤ pi(ai, x)
by definition.
If x /∈ Dãi,ai , then sup
n≥K
(pi(ai, xn))≤ pi(ai, x). Thus
limsup
n
(pi(ai, xn))) = in f
k≥1
sup
n≥k
(pi(ai, xn))≤ sup
n≥K
(pi(ai, xn))≤ pi(ai, x)
giving the result.
Proof. Case 2: Suppose ∀K > 0, ∃kK ≥ K, xkK /∈ Dãi,ai . Let Ñ ⊆ N be those indices such that
n ∈ Ñ⇒ xn /∈ Dãi,ai , and define m : N→ N by m(n) = min( j)
j∈Ñ
j≥n
. Define the sequence (x
′
n)
∞
n=1 by the
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formula x
′
n = xm(n). Then we have the following:
1. ∀n, pi(ai, x
′
n)≥ pi(ai, xn) : Let n be given. If xn ∈ Dãi,ai , then pi(ai, x
′
n)≥ 0 = pi(ai, xn). If
xn /∈ Dãi,ai , then x
′
n = xm(n) = xn, so the inequality follows.
2. x
′
n → x: Let ε > 0 be given. Since xn → x, ∃K, ∀n ≥ K, |xn− x| < ε . Since for all n,
m(n) = min( j)
j∈Ñ
j≥n
≥ n, then for all n≥ K, |x′n− x|= |xm(n)− x|< ε , giving convergence.
Finally, limsup
n
(pi(ai, xn))≤ limsup
n
(pi(ai, x
′
n))≤ pi(ai, x) , where the first inequality follows
from 1. The second follows from 2., the fact that (x
′
n)
∞
n=1 ⊆ (Dãi,ai)C, and that by Lemma 11,
pi(ai, ·) is upper semi-continuous on X∩(Dãi,ai)C. 2
We are now in a position to complete the proof of Proposition 4 below:
Proof. (of Proposition 4) The first claim was established after Lemma 10. For the second claim,
let x be given. Let λi ∈ 4(A−i) be such that λi(ã−i) ≥ max
ai
(pi(ai, x)). Choose any a
′
i, giving
λi(ã−i)≥ pi(a
′
i, x). If x∈Dãi,a
′
i , we trivially have that li(a
′
i, λi, x)≥ 0. If x /∈Dãi,a
′
i , then by the first
part of Lemma 10, λi(ã−i) ≥ pi(a
′
i, x)⇒ li(a
′
i, λi, x) ≥ 0. Thus λi(ã−i) ≥ maxai
(pi(ai, x)) implies
that for any a
′
i, li(a
′
i, λi, x)≥ 0 . Since pi(x) is defined as the smallest value satisfying this property,
we must have that max
ai
(pi(ai, x))≥ pi(x). For a contradiction, suppose that this inequality is strict.
Since for all x ∈ Dãi, max
ai
(pi(ai, x)) = 0, we must have that x /∈ Dãi . In particular, let a
′
i be such
that x /∈ Dãi,a
′
i and max
ai
(pi(ai, x)) = pi(a
′
i, x), so that x /∈ Dãi,a
′
i and pi(a
′
i, x)> pi(x). By repeating
the second part of Lemma 10 with pi(x) in place of pi(ai, x), we must have that for any λi ∈
4(A−i) such that λi(ã−i)> pi(a
′
i, x), li(a
′
i, λi, x)> 0, contradicting pi(a
′
i, x) = max
λi∈4(A−i)
li(a
′
i ,λi,x)=0
(λi(ã−i)).
Therefore, pi(x) = max
ai
(pi(ai, x)). The fact that pi(x) is upper semi-continuous on X follows from
the fact that each p̂i(ai, x) is. 2
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Lemma 5 is now proven:
Proof. (Of Lemma 5) The first assertion is given in CvD (1993) and is thus omitted.
For the second assertion, for each player i, let ϕvi denote the pdf of vεi, which is distributed
uniformly on [−v, v]. After receiving xi, we have that
f ∗i (x−i|xi, v) =
Pr (xi &x−i)
Pr (xi)
=
´ xi+v
xi−v f
∗(x)ϕvi (xi− x)
(
∏
j 6=i
ϕvj (x j− x)
)
dx
´
RN−1
´ xi+v
xi−v f
∗(x)ϕvi (xi− x)
(
∏
j 6=i
ϕvj (x j− x)
)(
∏
j 6=i
dx j
)
dx
Because xi ∈ I, f ∗(x) will be constant on the entire range of integration, and thus after factoring
this out and noticing that the denominator now equals 1, we have
f ∗i (x−i|xi, v) =
ˆ xi+v
xi−v
ϕ
v
i (xi− x)
(
∏
j 6=i
ϕ
v
j (x j− x)
)
dx
Since each ϕvj (x j− x) =
1
2v on [x j− v, x j + v] and zero elsewhere, we then have that
f ∗i (x−i|xi, v) =
(
1
2v
)N
m
(
∩
j∈I
[x j− v, x j + v]
)
where m(I) is the length of any interval I.
To make the calculation F∗i (~x−i|xi, v), consider vectors of the form~xi−a=
(
xi−a j
)
j 6=i, where
each a j ∈ [0, 2v). By the above equation we have that whenever am = max
j 6=i
(
a j
)
,
f ∗i (~xi−a|xi, v) =
(
1
2v
)N
(2v−am) , 0≤ am ≤ 2v
If we let I /{i}= {1.2, ..., N−1} denote the set of player i’s opponents, then for any k ∈I /{i}
and corresponding ak, the above equation then gives
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Pr ({0≤ a1 < a2 < · · ·< ak ≤ 2v}|xi, v) =
ˆ 2v
0
ˆ ak
0
· · ·
ˆ a2
0
(
1
2v
)N
(2v−ak)
k
∏
j=1
da j
For any such k, there are (N−2)! orderings of the
(
a j
)
j 6=i,k with ak as the largest. Thus if we
denote the set
Ak = {~xi−a |0≤ a1 < a2 < · · ·< ak ≤ 2v}
and notice that3 {xi−2v≤ xk ≤ ·· · ≤ x2 ≤ x1 ≤ xi} ⊇ Ak, we then have that
Pr ({xi−2v≤ xk ≤ ·· · ≤ x2 ≤ x1 ≤ xi}|xi, v)≥
ˆ
Ak
f ∗i (~xi−a|xi, v)da =
(N−2)!
ˆ 2v
0
ˆ ak
0
· · ·
ˆ a2
0
(
1
2v
)N
(2v−ak)
k
∏
j=1
da j
Finally, notice that {x−i ≤~xi} ⊇ ∪
j 6=i
A j, so that
F∗i (~x−i|xi, v)≥∑
j 6=i
(ˆ
A j
f ∗i (~xi−a|xi, v)da
)
=
(N−1)(N−2)!
ˆ 2v
0
ˆ ak
0
· · ·
ˆ a2
0
(
1
2v
)N (
2v−a j
) k
∏
j=1
da j =
(N−1)!
ˆ 2v
0
ˆ ak
0
· · ·
ˆ a2
0
(
1
2v
)N
(2v−ak)
k
∏
j=1
da j =
1
N
giving the result. 2
Theorem 8 is proven below:
Proof. (of Theorem 8) Choose ε > 0 and let v(ε) ∈ (0, εK ], where K is the Lipschitz constant
associated with players’ utility. Choosing any v ∈ (0, v(ε)], we proceed by induction by showing
that for each n≥ 0, Sn(0)⊆ S∗∗n (ε).
For n = 0, S0(0) = S = S∗∗0 (ε). Suppose that for some n≥ 0, Sn(0)⊆ S∗∗n (ε). Let s∈ Sn+1(0) =
3This is true on supp( f ∗i (x−i|xi, v)).
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UR(Sn(0), ε), and fix xi for some player i∈ I. Then ∀ai ∈Ai, ∃s−i ∈ Sn(0),4πx,x−i(si(xi), ai, s−i, xi)≥
0. This implies that4
0≤4πx,z−i(si(xi), ai s−i, xi) =
ˆ
Zxi
ˆ
R
4ui(si(xi), ai, s−i, x)dµ̃i(z−i, x|xi, v)
≤
ˆ
Zxi
ˆ
R
4ui(si(xi), ai, s−i, xi)dµ̃i(z−i, x|xi, v)+Kv
=
ˆ
Zxi
4ui(si(xi), ai, s−i, xi)dµ̃∗∗i (z−i|xi, v)+Kv
That is, ˆ
Zxi
4ui(si(xi), ai, s−i, xi)dµ̃∗∗i (z−i|xi, v)≥−Kv≥−ε
Since s−i ∈ Sn(0) ⊆ S∗∗n (ε), this shows that si survives ε−iterated deletion at round n in the
game G∗∗(v), and thus
Sn+1(0) =UR(Sn(0), ε)⊆UR(S∗∗n (ε), 0) = S∗∗n+1(ε)
completing the induction step. Therefore,
SU(G(v), 0) = ∩
n≥0
Sn(ε)⊆ ∩
n≥0
S∗∗n (ε) = SU(G
∗∗(v), ε)
concluding the proof. 2
4The second line follows from the fact that after receiving signal xi, the support of player i’s beliefs about x are
contained in (xi− v, xi + v) and that by Lipschitz continuity, x ∈ B(xi, v) implies |ui(a, xi)−ui(a, x)| ≤ Kv, ∀a ∈ A.
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Appendix B
Additional Proofs, Chapter 3
First, Lemma 8 is proven, showing that when beliefs are geometrically weighted, they satisfy
monotonicity and are asymptotically empirical.
Proof. (Lemma 8) Concentrating on the right hand side, to establish monotonicity, assume that
µi(ht0)≤F µi(h
t0) and ht  ht for some t ≥ t0, where ht =
(
at0+1, at0+2, ..., at
)
and ht =
(
at0+1, at0+2, ..., at
)
.
The result holds trivially for t = t0 by hypothesis. Suppose for t0 ≤ l ≤ t − 1, µi(ht0 , ..., al) ≤F
µi(h
t0, ..., al), and let E ⊆ A−i be increasing. Since al+1  al+1, by the increasingness of E,
1{al+1−i }(E)≤ 1{al+1−i }(E). Thus,
µi(ht0, ..., al, al+1)(E) = (1−λt)µi(ht0 , ..., al)(E)+λt1{al+1−i }(E)≤
µi(ht , yt+1))≤F µi(ht)≤F µi(ht , zt+1))
Therefore, µi(ht0, ..., al, al+1)≤F µi(h
t0, ..., al, al+1). Because the left hand side can be done sim-
ilarly, we see that the first condition is satisfied.
For the next condition, suppose that
(
∨ht−i
)
∨M̄i zt+1−i for t ≥ t0, and let E ⊆A−i be increasing.
Note that we immediately have that
zt+1−i 
(
∨ht−i
)
∨ M̄i  supp
(
µi(ht)
)
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If zt+1−i /∈ E, then by increasingness of E and the inequality above, supp(µi(ht))∩E = /0. Thus
µi(ht+1)(E)≥ 0 = µi(ht)
If zt+1−i ∈ E, then
µi(ht+1)(E) = (1−λt+1)µi(ht)(E)+λt+1 = µi(ht)(E)+λt+1(1−µi(ht)(E))≥ µi(ht)(E)
Therefore µi(ht) ≤F µi(ht+1). Since the left hand side can be done similarly, we see that beliefs
satisfy monotonicity.
Lastly, we show that beliefs are asymptotically empirical, which must be done according to
weak convergence because of arbitrary action spaces. Suppose that at → â, consider i ∈ I, and let
f : A−i→ R be continuous. For each ε > 0, let Uε be the open set in A−i containing â−i such that
∀a−i ∈Uε , | f (ā−i)− f (a−i)|< ε2 . By compactness, let M be the absolute maximum value attained
on A−i by f . Since at−i→ â−i, by geometric updating we have that for each ε > 0, there exists a
T ε ≥ 0 such that for each t ≥ T ε , µi(ht)
(
(Uε)C
)
< ε4M .
Let ε > 0 be given, and choose the corresponding Uε and T ε . Then for each t ≥ T ε ,
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ˆ
A−i
f d1{â−i}−
ˆ
A−i
f dµi(ht)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ˆ
A−i
f (â−i)dµi(ht)−
ˆ
A−i
f dµi(ht)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ˆ
(Uε )C
( f (â−i)− f )dµi(ht)+
ˆ
Uε
( f (â−i)− f )dµi(ht)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ˆ
(Uε )C
( f (â−i)− f )dµi(ht)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ˆ
Uε
( f (â−i)− f )dµi(ht)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ (2M)µi(ht)
(
(Uε)C
)
+
(
ε
2
)
µi(ht)(Uε)<
(
ε
2
)
+
(
ε
2
)
= ε
Therefore at → â implies that for each i, µi(ht)→ 1{â−i}, giving the result.
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Claim 3 of Proposition 6 is given below, which follows along the lines of Theorem 1 in EE.
First, one more definition is introduced.
Definition 25. ∀i ∈ I, Ui satisfies the strict single-crossing property on Ai ×4(A−i) if for all
a
′
i, ai ∈ Ai such that a
′
i > ai and µ
′
, µ ∈4(A−i) such that µ
′ F µ ,
Ui(a
′
i, µ)−Ui(ai, µ)≤ 0⇒Ui(a
′
i, µ
′
)−Ui(ai, µ
′
)< 0
Lemma 13. Define the poset T =
{
µ
′
, µ
}
⊆ 4(A−i) by supposing that µ
′
>F µ . If Ui satisfies
the strict single-crossing property on Ai×T , then
∧BRi(µ)≥ ∨BRi(µ
′
)
Proof. Suppose that ∨BRi(µ
′
)> ∧BRi(µ). By Claim 1 of Proposition 6, we have that ∧BRi(µ) ∈
BRi(µ), so that Ui(∨BRi(µ
′
), µ)−Ui(∧BRi(µ), µ) ≤ 0. Thus by the strict single-crossing prop-
erty,
Ui(∨BRi(µ
′
), µ
′
)−Ui(∧BRi(µ), µ ′)<Ui(∨BRi(µ
′
), µ)−Ui(∧BRi(µ), µ)≤ 0
so that Ui(∧BRi(µ), µ ′)>Ui(∨BRi(µ
′
), µ
′
), which, again by Claim 1, contradicts ∨BRi(µ
′
) ∈
BRi(µ
′
).
Proof. (Claim 3, Proposition 6) The case of when a−i = a−i is shown, the other case follows
similarly. The result follows from Lemma 13 by showing that Ui satisfies the strict single-crossing
property on Ai×T , where T = {σ̂−i, µε}. It is easy to verify that for any increasing set A⊆ A−i,
µε(A) ≥ σ̂−i(A), and that by considering the set E ≡ [a−i, ∨A−i] ⊆ A−i, µε(E) > σ̂−i(E). Thus
µε >F σ̂−i.
Let a
′
i, ai ∈ Ai be such that a
′
i > ai, and suppose that Ui(ai, σ̂)−Ui(a
′
i, σ̂) ≥ 0. We must
show that Ui(ai, µεi )−Ui(a
′
i, µ
ε
i ) > 0. Define the function l : A→ R as in Claim 2. Since µεi =
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(1− ε)σ̂−i + ε1{a−i}, we have that
Ui(ai, µε)−Ui(a
′
i, µ
ε) = (1− ε)
ˆ
A−i
l(a−i)dσ̂−i +
ˆ
A−i
l(a−i)d
(
1a−i
)
= (1− ε)
(
Ui(a
′
i, σ̂−i)−Ui(ai, σ̂−i)
)
+ εl(a−i)
Suppose by way of contradiction that Ui(ai, µε)−Ui(a
′
i, µ
ε)≤ 0. By hypothesis, Ui(ai, σ̂−i)−
Ui(a
′
i, σ̂−i) ≥ 0, so that we must have l(a−i) ≤ 0. By strict decreasing differences, l is strictly
increasing, so that ∀a−i ∈ BR−i(σ̂)/{a−i}, l(a−i)< 0.
We now show that σ̂−i (BR−i(σ̂)/{a−i}) = 0. To see this, note if σ̂−i (BR−i(σ̂)/{a−i}) > 0 ,
then
0 >
ˆ
BR−i(σ̂)/{a−i}
l(a−i)dσ̂−i ≥
ˆ
A−i
l(a−i)dσ̂−i =Ui(ai, σ̂−i)−Ui(a
′
i, σ̂−i)
where the first inequality comes from the fact that l(a−i) < 0 for all a−i ∈ BR−i(σ̂)/{a−i},
and the second from the fact that since σ̂ is a MSNE, supp(σ̂−i) ⊆ BR−i(σ̂). This contradicts
Ui(a
′
i, σ̂−i)−Ui(ai, σ̂−i) ≥ 0. Thus, σ̂−i (BR−i(σ̂)/{a−i}) = 0. However, since supp(σ̂−i) ⊆
BR−i(σ̂), this implies that σ̂−i(a−i) = 1, contradicting the fact that σ̂ is properly mixed.
We now provide the proof for Proposition 8 in terms of pai , the case for pai follows similarly.
First, we begin with two necessary Lemmas.
Lemma 14. Suppose that Γ = (I, (Ai)i∈I, (ui)i∈I) be a strict GSS and that there exsits a PMSNE
σ̂ such that for each player i ∈ I, ai, ai ∈ BRi (σ̂−i). Then BR(a) = a and BR(a) = a.
Proof. Since each Ai is assumed finite, ∧BRi and ∨BRi are continuous functions on A−i, so that by
Proposition 7, ∧BRi (a−i) = ai and ∨BRi
(
a−i
)
= ai. By Proposition 6 (3), since
1{a−i} = (1− ε)σ̂−i + ε1{a−i}
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with ε = 1, we then have
∧BRi
(
1{a−i}
)
= ai ∈ BRi (σ̂i) ∧BRi (σ̂i) ∨BRi
(
1{a−i}
)
= ai
so that BRi (a−i) = ai, the other case following similarly.
For ai 6= ai, define Λai(ai) =
{
λ ∈4(A−i) | lai(ai, λ ) = 0
}
, and
pi(ai) =

0, ai strictlydominatesai
max
λ∈Λai(ai)
(λi(ai)) otherwise
Lemma 15. If ai ∈ Ai is such that ai does not strictly dominate ai, then Λai is non-empty and
compact. Therefore, pi(ai) is well-defined.
Proof. Since ai = BRi(a−i), l
ai(ai, 1{a−i})> 0 . Suppose for all µ ∈4(A−i), l
ai(ai, µ)> 0. Then
for all a−i, lai(ai, 1{a−i})> 0, contradicting the fact that ai does not strictly dominate ai. Thus for
some µ̄i, lai(ai, µ)≤ 0 . Consider the set of probability measures
Z =
µα =

α +(1−α)µ̄(a−i) i f a−i = a−i
(1−α)µ̄(a−i) i f a−i 6= a−i
| α ∈ [0, 1]

Note that µ1 = 1{a−i} and µ
0 = µ̄ , giving us lai(ai, µ1)> 0, lai(ai, µ0)≤ 0 , and that lai(ai, µα) is a
continuous function of α . By the intermediate value theorem, ∃ᾱ ∈ [0, 1) such that lai(ai, µα) = 0.
Therefore, Λai is non-empty.
To show compactness, suppose (µn)∞i=1 ⊆ Λai is such that µn→ µ . By continuity, lai(ai, µ) =
lim
n→∞
(
lai(ai, µn)
)
= 0, thus µ ∈ Λai , so that Λai is closed. Since Λai ⊆4(A−i), which is compact,
we have that Λai is compact also.
Proof. (Proposition 8) If ai strictly dominates ai, then by the definition of p
ai
i (ai), we have that
pi(ai) = 0 = p
ai
i (ai). Now suppose that ai does not strictly dominate ai.
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It is first shown that paii (ai)≤ pi(ai). In order to do this, we show that for all µ
′ ∈4(A−i) such
that µ
′
(a−i) ≥ pi(ai), lai(ai, µ
′
) ≥ 0. Because paii (ai) is defined as the lowest value that satisfies
this property, the conclusion follows. Suppose µ
′ ∈ 4(A−i) is such that µ
′
(a−i) ≥ pi(ai), but
lai(ai, µ
′
)< 0. Since ai = BRi(a−i), l
ai(ai, 1{a−i})> 0. Consider the set of probability measures
Z =
µαi =

α +(1−α)µ ′i (a−i) i f a−i = a−i
(1−α)µ ′i (a−i) i f a−i 6= a−i
| α ∈ [0, 1]

and note that µ1 = 1{a−i} and µ
0 = µ
′
i , giving us l
ai(ai, µ1) > 0, and lai(ai, µ0) < 0 . Since
lai(ai, µα) is a continuous function of α , by the intermediate value theorem ∃ᾱ ∈ (0, 1) such
that lai(ai, µα) = 0. Since µ ᾱ(a−i) = ᾱ +(1− ᾱ)µ
′
(a−i) > µ
′
(a−i), we have found a µ
ᾱ such
that lai(ai, µα) = 0 but µ ᾱ(a−i) > µ
′
(a−i) ≥ pi(ai), contradicting the definition of pi(ai). Hence
pai(ai)≤ pi(ai).
To show equality, suppose that paii (ai) < pi(ai). We will show that for any µ
′′
such that
µ
′′
(a−i) > p
ai
i (ai), we must have that l
ai(ai, µ
′′
) > 0. Hence if paii (ai) < pi(ai) is true, any µ
′
i
such that µ
′
i (a−i) = pi(ai) must be such that l
ai(ai, µ
′′
) > 0, a direct contradiction to the exis-
tence of pi(ai). Note that this will also establish part 4 of Proposition 8, since Ai is finite. Let
A = argmin
a−i
(4ui(ai, ai, a−i)). Note that a−i is not part of this set, for if it were, then for all a−i
we’d have by the fact that ai = BRi
(
a−i
)
by Lemma 2, 4ui(ai, ai, a−i) ≥ 4ui(ai, ai, a−i) > 0,
contradicting the fact that ai does not strictly dominate ai. Let µ be such that µi(a−i) = p
ai
i (ai),
and assign to all a−i in A the probability
1−µi(a−i)
|A | . By the definition of p
ai
i (ai), we must have that
lai(ai, µ)≥ 0. Now let µ
′
be such that µ
′
(a−i)> p
ai
i (ai), and assign to all a−i in A the probability
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1−µ ′i (a−i)
|A | . Note that we have
1
lai(ai, µ
′
) =4ui(ai, ai, a−i)µ
′
i (a−i)+
(
1−µ ′i (a−i)
|A |
)
∑
A
4ui(ai, ai, a−i)>
4ui(ai, ai, a−i)µi(a−i)+
(
1−µi(a−i)
|A |
)
∑
A
4ui(ai, ai, a−i) = lai(ai, µ)≥ 0.
Finally, let µ
′′
be arbitrary but satisfying µ
′′
(a−i) = µ
′
(a−i). Because l
ai(ai, µ
′
) ≥ 0 gives the
smallest value for such probability measures, we have that lai(ai, µ
′′
)≥ lai(ai, µ
′
)> lai(ai, µ)≥ 0,
or lai(ai, µ
′′
)> 0. This establishes parts 1, 2, and 4 of Proposition 8.
For part 3 of Proposition 8, let i ∈ I and consider any ai not strictly dominated by ai. By above,
paii (ai) = max
λ∈4(A−i)
lai (ai,λ )=0
(
λ (a−i)
)
Notice that for all λ ∈ 4(A−i) such that lai(ai, λ ) = 0, we must have that λ (a−i) < 1. If not,
then λ = 1{a−i}. But by Lemma 14, since ai = BRi
(
a−i
)
we must have that lai(ai, λ ) > 0. This
contradicts lai(ai, λ ) = 0, and thus we must have that p
ai
i (ai)< 1. Since each Ai is finite, it follows
that paii < 1 . The case for p
ai following similarly.
1 Note that ∑
A
4ui(ai, ai, a−i)≤ 0: If4ui(ai, ai, a−i)> 0 for each a−i, the fact that ai does not strictly dominate ai
is violated. Thus for some a−i,4ui(ai, ai, a−i)≤ 0, and the conclusion follows by the definition of A .
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